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III – ABSTRACT 
 
For the past three decades, truth commissions have attracted wide 
interest among scholars, as many of them have focused on researching, 
analysing, criticising and publishing studies about truth commissions 
around the world. But, the Brazilian truth and reconciliation commission, 
however, is yet an unknown ground with very few publications on its work. 
And as Brazilian’s truth commission was stablished in 2011 and Its final 
reports released in 2014. This research has the objective to investigate the 
proceedings of the Brazilian truth and reconciliation commission, its 
components, research methods, its purpose and how much reconciliation 
was achieved, together with the consequences of its results, and how they 
were handled by Brazil’s legal System. Using qualitative data and 
bibliography research, analysing the reports and all the bibliography that 
was released using them as a basis. This thesis has as its main goal, to 
give an international approach on analysing Brazil’s Truth Commission and 
the impact of its work on Transitional Justice.
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IV – RESUMO 
 
 Nas ultimas três décadas, comissões da verdade vem atraindo um 
grande interesse a volta dos académicos, já que muitos deles tem focado 
em produzir pesquisas, analisar, criticar e publicar estudos sobre as 
comissões da verdade pelo mundo. Mas, a comissão da verdade Brasileira 
é ainda um território com poucos estudos e publicações sobre o seu 
trabalho. Por vez que a comissão da verdade Brasileira foi formada em 
2011 e seu relatório final foi publicado em 2014. Este estudo tem o objetivo 
de investigar os procedimentos da comissão da verdade Brasileira, seus 
componentes, métodos de pesquisa e investigação, seus objetivos e 
quanta reconciliação foi alcançada, junto de suas consequências, 
resultados e como eles foram aceitos pelo sistema judiciário Brasileiro. 
Utilizando os métodos qualitativos e pesquisas bibliográficas, analisando 
os relatórios e toda a bibliografia que foi lançada com base nos seus 
processos. Esta dissertação de mestrado tem como principal objetivo, dar 
uma visão internacional na analise da comissão da verdade Brasileira, 
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For the past three decades, truth commissions - one of the major 
policy measures created to deal with past human rights violations in 
transitional and post-conflict societies - have attracted wide interest among 
social scientists and moral, legal, and political philosophers.1 Many 
scholars have focused on researching, analysing, criticising and publishing 
studies about truth commissions around the world. The Brazilian truth 
commission, however, is yet an unknown ground with very few publications 
on its work. 
 It has been almost seven years since the creation of the Brazilian 
Comissão Nacional da Verdade (CNV) [National Truth Commission], the 
first official truth commission established in Brazil through the law 12.528, 
on 12 November 2011.2 This transitional justice tool, created as an 
independent body3, was meant to deal with the scars of the past by 
investigating all human rights abuses that occurred from 1946 to 1988, 
inside and outside national territory. But to what extent does the Brazilian 
example contribute to the broader picture as a transitional justice tool? Did 
the CNV achieve its purposes? What can be learned with the experience 
left by the commission’s work?  
 This research will give more visibility to the CNV’s proceedings, as 
well as serving to achieve some of the purposes of transitional justice, that 
is, to build information and expertise upon the procedures of Truth 
Commissions, creating a network and bibliography for the future.  
In Brazil’s case, the scars that were left behind on the transition to 
democracy were never appropriately treated: victims were muted by laws 
and political schemes that stopped accountability of past human rights 
abuses, as the transition caused impunity and did not allow any official 
                                               
1 USAMI, Makoto – Defining Truth Commission, 2016, p. 56. 
2 Lei nº 12.528, de 18 de Novembro de 2011, Cria a Comissão Nacional da Verdade. 
3 BAKINER, Onur – Truth Commissions: Memory, Power, and Legitimacy, 2016, p. 24-26.  






investigations of massive human rights abuses for almost 32 years,4 until 
the establishment of the CNV. 
 Therefore, the creation of the CNV raised many questions about its 
effectiveness in dealing with the past: Why did Brazil need a truth 
commission? Why was it formed so late? How did the truth commission’s 
impact change the mindset of society about its own past? Were the impacts 
of the truth commission effective enough to achieve the objectives traced 
in its creation? In order to achieve the main goal of this paper - which is to 
give an international approach on examining Brazil’s Truth Commission 
and its impact on transitional justice - these and other questions were 
answered using qualitative data and bibliography research, in addition to 
analysing the reports and bibliography based on it. 
 This paper is structured to build up the study of the CNV from the 
roots of transitional justice towards the most recent impacts on Brazilian 
society. Chapter two starts with an explanation about the evolution of 
transitional justice in the world, going through the phases of transitional 
justice, naming its tools and analysing how they are important to achieve 
the goals of transition (or even in non-transitional backgrounds). The 
chapter then moves on to the historical context of its development and how 
this changed transitional justice through decades, finishing with its 
importance in the process of healing. 
 Chapter three focuses specifically on the role of truth commissions 
to accomplish the objectives traced by transitional justice, and to achieve 
the need of society as a whole. It focuses on bringing these tools closer to 
the reality of Latin-America, seeing the historical changes of truth-
commissions, how they are formed and their main objectives, while 
explaining the importance of the truth in the healing process. 
 Chapter four goes through the human rights abuses in Brazil, starting 
with an analysis of the time frame aimed by the CNV, setting a socio-
                                               
4 SKIDMORE, Thomas E.; SILVA, Mário Salviano – Brasil: de castelo a Tancredo, 1964-1985, 
1985. 
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economic, political and historical context, besides showing the international 
influence on the roots of the military dictatorship. This is followed by an 
explanation of why Brazil waited almost 32 years to start an official body to 
investigate the massive human rights abuses of the past; and the influence 
of the controversial amnesty law that emerged as an attempt to re-establish 
relations between the military officers and the regime opponents, in order 
to transition towards a new regime.5 The chapter ends with an analysis on 
the early works of the CNV and the unofficial truth bodies that investigated 
the human rights abuses, while the state was struggling to establish an 
official truth commission. 
 Chapter five is a technical analysis of the CNV itself. It includes the 
process of investigation: how it was structured; the report and the results 
that were set up in order to achieve the CNV’s objectives; how they handled 
victims and perpetrators, and the role of society during the investigation, 
as well as the obstacles that were faced by the CNV in order to achieve its 
goals. 
 Chapter six, for its part, is a deep analysis of the effects of the truth 
commission. With a critical approach to the CNV, it takes into consideration 
the recommendations and the effectiveness of them by showing the 
reflexes of their work, legacy and applicability. Finally, this last chapter 
brings a critical response to the proceedings, as a way to reach a 
conclusion on whether the Brazilian Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
was in fact an effective tool in dealing with the past. 
 Just as “Remembering is not easy, but forgetting may be 
impossible.”6, the process of a truth commission is sensitive, since it works 
with memories of a horrendous past and touching the marks of those who 
survived. The importance of analysing the consequences, achievements 
                                               
5 MEZAROBBA, Glenda – Um acerto de contas com o futuro: a anistia e suas conseqüências, 
um estudo do caso brasileiro, 2006, p.146-147. 
6 HAYNER, Priscilla B – Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth 
Commissions, 2010, Pg 2. 






and the technical procedures of these Transitional Justice Tools shows its 
fundamental value as we see the effects that it produces in our society.





2 - The Evolution of Transitional Justice. 
 
 Transitional justice became known and gained global significance as 
an umbrella term for approaches to deal with the past in the aftermath of 
violent conflict or dictatorial regimes close to the period known as the Cold 
War.7 The term was first coined in the early 1990’s, by analysts whose 
attempts to construct a concept, and a field, drew in large part on the Latin-
America struggle in the 1980s and 1990s to deal with the terrible human 
cost of repressive dictatorships.8 And it has since come to describe an ever 
expanding range of mechanisms and institutions, including: tribunals, truth 
commissions, memorial projects, reparations and the like to redress past 
wrongs, vindicate the dignity of victims and provide justice in times of 
transition.9 
 When we go through the origins of modern transitional justice, they 
are widely traced to the end of World War II, a period known as Phase I, or 
the post-war phase.10 Phase II begins with the end of the Cold War, known 
as the post-Cold War phase, as it is associated with the wave of democratic 
transitions and modernisation that began in 1989.11. In this phase, global 
politics were characterised by an acceleration in conflict resolution and a 
persistent discourse of justice throughout law and society. And phase III of 
transitional justice is connected to the contemporary world, as it emerges 
in persistent conflicts where transitional justice seems to change from an 
exception to the norm, to become a model to the rule of law. Used as a 
remedy that expands the discourse of humanitarian justice, but also 
disseminates the legal system associated with generalised conflict and 
contributes to structure the law of terrorism.12 
                                               
7 JONES, Briony; BERNATH, Julie – Resistance and transitional justice, 2017, p.1. 
8 SKAAR, Elin; GARCÍA-GODOS, Jemima; COLLINS, Cath – Transitional justice in Latin 
America: the uneven road from impunity towards accountability, 2016. 
9 BUCKLEY-ZISTEL, Susanne [et al] – Transitional Justice Theories, 2014, p.1.  
10 TEITEL, Ruti G. – Globalizing Transitional Justice: Contemporary essays, 2015, p. 31, 39-40. 
11 TEITEL, R. G., 2015, p.50. 
12 TEITEL, R. G., 2015, p.50-52. 







2.1 - The Phases of Transitional Justice evolution. 
 
 Phase I, or the post-war phase, encompasses the post-World War II 
Model of Justice through its most recognised symbol, the Allied-run 
Nuremberg Trials.13 However, history begins earlier in this same century, 
following World War I, since the central aim of justice in between wars was 
to delineate the parameters of a justifiable punishment by the international 
community.14 It was clear that the national trials in World War I, did not 
serve to deter future carnage, mainly because these transitional justice 
solutions clearly failed and are pointed out as the ones responsible for the 
hatred and economic frustration that fuelled Germany towards its place in 
World War II.15 This led transitional justice to, in post-World War II,  begin 
by eschewing national prosecution, and instead, seek international criminal 
accountability for the Third Reich’s leadership, as an evident critical 
response to the past.16 
 In this first phase, transitional justice aimed towards accountability, 
striking with an innovative approach (at the time), which was the application 
of an international criminal law beyond the barriers of state and reaching 
individuals.17 More so, the influence of the international community on the 
transitional justice tools came as a way to justify and legitimate the Allied 
intervention, creating an image of victor’s justice on national level.  And so, 
the international legal order held the Reich’s higher echelons accountable 
for their persecutory policy and human rights offences, making clear that 
the Nuremberg prosecution was intended to legitimate the Allied 
intervention in the aftermath of world war II.18 
                                               
13 On the history of those deliberations, see CONOT, Robert E. – Justice at Nuremberg, 1993. 
14 TEITEL, R. G., 2015, p.51. 
15 TEITEL, R. G., 2015, p.52. 
16 CONOT, R. E., 1993.  
17 TEITEL, R., 2015, p.52. 
18 TEITEL, R., 2015, p.51. 





 The model of transitional justice featured in Phase I offered a very 
limited precedent, especially with the Cold War bifurcation, as it became 
clear that this model of transitional justice could not be used as a basis for 
further development on transition policy. 19 
 Due to the trials, conventions and all the legacy left by this period, 
transitional justice expanded to transcend its operative action upon states. 
Leaving the narrowed scope of accountability to justify post-war 
intervention of international agents on a national level and heading towards 
a new Phase. 20 
 Phase II emerges in a period of political fragmentation and fast-
paced democratisation, followed by many historical moments resulted from 
a giant wave of globalisation. One of these most crucial moments was the 
collapse of the Soviet Union – which caused the end of the bipolar balance 
of power – as well as the attendant proliferation of political democratisation 
and modernisation ushered in this post-Cold War phase.21 
 The withdrawal of Soviet-supported guerrilla forces in the late 1970s 
fuelled the end of military rule in South America,22 which began  a wave of 
democratic transitions that are often described as isolated events that 
emerged as a result of civil wars and political conflict. However, these 
conflicts were actually fostered by international politics of power, resulted 
from the political equilibrium of the Cold War, that ended as a consequence 
of the Soviet collapse.23 
  During the 1980s political transitions, questions on to what extent 
the Phase I models of transitional justice could be applied were raised, as 
new democracies started to emerge in South America leading towards new 
                                               
19 LUBAN, David – Legal Modernism, 1994, p. 336. 
20 TEITEL, R., 2015, p.51. 
21 See more in HUNTINGTON, Samuel P.  – The third wave: Democratization in the late 
twentieth century, 1991. 
22 See more about the Latin-American transitions in SCHMITTER, Phillippe C.; O’DONNELL, 
Guilhermo; WHITEHEAD Laurence – Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America, 1986; 
and SKAAR, E.; GARCÍA-GODOS, J.; COLLINS, C., 2016. 
23 TEITEL, R., p.51. 






politics of transition.24 It was unclear if trials, like the ones created in the 
aftermath of World War II, could be successfully implemented to hold the 
dictatorships’ leaders accountable.25 Considering that these transitions 
were often seen as isolated cases, with no external influences, the 
successor regimes attempted to distinguish the context from that of 
international post-war justice and called for domestic trials26 , which is a 
major diversion from Phase I, where the international community played an 
important role on the political transitions. Nevertheless, despite the 
absence of international trials on Phase II, the transitional justice 
jurisprudence shows that international law ought to play an important role, 
contributing with an alternative source to guide the national trials in these 
transitional societies. This can be seen by the fact that, although Phase II 
relied on the national justice system as a critical approach to Phase I, this 
new model of transitional justice was eventually not appropriate for later 
globalised politics.27 The national trials held on Phase II and the complexity 
of political transitions proved that transitional justice was not just an 
interventional tool, or an external factor that imposes criminal sanctions on 
Human Rights abuses, but a way to promote state building as a multi-factor 
way.  
 This multi-factor approach of transitional justice appears when we 
analyse it as a political process of negotiation between a set of diverse 
actors, including conflicting parties, mediators, newly constituted 
governments, donor countries, inter-governmental organisations, the civil 
society and victim groups.28 More so, the transitional justice community 
spans over many disciplines as different as law, political science, 
                                               
24 For a leading advice of the Nuremberg Model, see Aryeh Never – What Should Be Done 
About the Guilty? 1990. 
25 SIKKINK, Kathryn; LUTZ, Ellen – The justice cascade: the evolution and impact of foreign 
human rights trials in Latin America. In: International Law and Society, 2017 p. 333-339. 
26 SCHOULTZ, Lars – National Security and United States Policy Towards Latin America, 1986, 
p. 112-204. 
27 TEITEL, R. G., 2015, p. 57. 
28 JONES, B.; BERNATH, J., 2018, p.1. 





sociology, psychology, anthropology and development studies, which differ 
significantly in perspectives and methodology.29 Setting up these array of 
actors shows the complexity of transitional justice, and its possibilities on 
how to apply the measures needed for transitions and state building. For 
that reason, narrowing down transitional justice as a State-centred field 
based on how it was applied in Latin-America would be a wrong approach. 
 The concept of transitional justice appears to be continually in motion 
along with the changes in the political scenario across the decades. 
Comparing Phase I and II, parallel to the discussions of how transitional 
justice should or could be understood as a concept, has continuously been 
expanded to be applicable in contexts devoid of any form of political 
transition.30  
 Furthermore, the internationalisation of transitional justice is evident 
from the new role played by international actors, such as UN agencies, 
international development partners and international NGOs. Instead of the 
role played in Phase I – criminal sanctions and accountability as a 
justification of intervention – they now provide technical advice and 
assistance to governments and others that attempt to create and 
implement a transitional justice solution.31 These international 
organisations play an important part, specially bringing expertise and a 
guideline on how to develop the procedures needed to achieve the 
objectives established. 
 The result of this new approach is that transitional justice is thus no 
longer viewed as an exemption task dealt by specialised departments in 
‘extraordinary’ political circumstances, but rather tends to form an 
integrated part of good governance, human rights and peace building 
programmes in the developing countries in which these agencies work.32 
                                               
29 BUCKLEY-ZISTEL, S., 2014, p.2.  
30 BUCKLEY-ZISTEL, S., 2014, p.3.  
31 BUCKLEY-ZISTEL, S., 2014, p.107.  
32 DUTHIE, R. – Toward a Development-sensitive Approach to Transitional Justice, 2008. 






This new mindset of transitional justice was what set the basis of its 
crossover to Phase III.  
 Phase III can be characterised as a steady-state phase, as the new 
millennium appears to be associated with the expansion and normalisation 
of transitional justice.33 It doesn’t mean that transitional justice has become 
an everyday matter, but that it not only appears on a war aftermath or in 
strong political transitions. What was just a legal phenomenon that 
emerged in exceptional post-conflict transitions now seems to be a reflex 
of ordinary times. 34 
 Today, it is known that transitional justice achieved the role of a 
policy response designed to address human rights violations, together with 
new concepts and tools applied to realities that are not necessarily 
undergoing political transition.35 The most recognisable symbol of this 
normalisation is the International Criminal Court (ICC), an international 
institution created at the end of the twentieth century that symbolises the 
consolidation of the Nuremberg model, through the creation of a permanent 
international entity, to prosecute crimes against humanity under 
international law. 36 
 The current normalisation of transitional justice takes form with the 
expansion of the law of war, as it battles with the enhancement of 
humanitarian law.37 This tension between the law of war and humanitarian 
law brings out new dilemmas, as the law of war is used as a basis for 
intervention38. These dilemmas are perpetuated through Phase III, where 
they shock with a new issue: terrorism.  
 Therefore, the expansion of the transitional justice discourse being 
applied to the issue of terrorism proves to be problematic, due to the 
                                               
33 TEITEL, R. G., 2015, p. 57. 
34 TEITEL, R. G., 2015, p. 58. 
35 JONES, B.; BERNATH, J., 2018, p.4. 
36 DUTHIE, R., 2008. 
37 HANSEN, Thomas Obel – The vertical and horizontal expansion of transitional justice, 2016. 
38 TEITEL, R., p.64. 





inadequacy of analogies between terrorism and war or political crisis.39 In 
Phase I and Phase II of transitional justice, the tools applied to transition 
tend to look backwards as a response to conflict that had come to an end. 
These measures aim to be reconstructive. Therefore, turning its application 
into a protective matter - as it is needed on a war against terrorism - is 
extremely problematic, especially because transitional justice is a response 
to past conflicts, and, consequently, it is difficult to adapt it to guarantee 
prospective security.40. 
 It’s easy to spot a controversy over transitional justice, as it 
transitions toward the end of the twentieth century involved in a somewhat 
artificial zero sum and dichotomous framework that centred on a set of 
apparent foundational dilemmas and related binaries: “punishment versus 
impunity”, “truth versus justice”, “justice versus peace”.41 These paradigms 
enter into a debate on the role of the state loomed large, with the problem 
of justice today revolving almost exclusively around state actors and 
related institutions and purposes.42 Discussing the role of the state and its 
responsibilities as a successor regime ought to respond to abuses that 
were perpetrated against its own citizens. 
  
2.2 - The Tools of Transitional Justice. 
 
 Transitional justice turned out as a complex arrange of tools and 
peace-building processes that was commonly associated with justice-
seeking for exceptional times, but, over time, its focus has been expanded 
to include a much broader range of mechanisms, goals and inquiries 
across a range of disciplines that are not necessarily applied only to states 
in transition.43 Along with the expansion and institutionalisation of the field, 
                                               
39 TEITEL, Ruti G. Transitional justice in a new era. Fordham Int'l LJ, 2002, p. 904. 
40 TEITEL, R. G., 2015, p. 65. 
41 HAZAN, Pierre – Judging Warm Judging History: Behing Truth and Reconciliation, 2010. 
42 TEITEL, R. G., 2015, p. XIII. 
43 BELL, Christine – Transitional justice, interdisciplinarity and the state of the ‘field’or ‘non-field’. 
International Journal of Transitional Justice, 2009. 






critical scholarship has increasingly highlighted the ways in which 
transitional justice processes are also inherently political.44 It is not, 
however, only based on a political decision, neither only played by actors 
linked to the state. Transitional justice moves through a diverse array of 
multiple actors. 
 Transitional justice was soon expanded beyond its original realm of 
punitive understandings that started on Phase I.45 Sparking a discussion 
on how  it can be best connected to development, and calling for a further 
expansion, blurs the boundaries of the initial concept, which leads to 
important developments and at the same time poses new theoretical 
challenges.46 These new problems urge the need to arrange a specific set 
of normative values to the international and local actors involved in 
transitional justice processes, portraying on the one hand, the international 
actors - as apolitical actors who are dedicated on ‘doing good’ - and, on the 
other hand, local actors - who might engage with transitional justice 
because of external pressures but will either try to subvert and block it or 
will remain unsatisfied by it.47 
 This internationalisation of transitional justice is important because, 
in principle, it allows justice to be pursued in instances where the political 
leadership lacks commitment to accountability. Through a potential impact 
on governance and electoral politics that are fundamentally different from 
State-driven transitional justice,48 where political influences could either 
shape the results, or only implement tools in favour of their will. 
 In contrast, approaches with a stronger emphasis on the notion of 
justice are guided by the question on what shape justice should take. They 
outline different understandings of the matter, such as punitive, corrective, 
                                               
44 JONES, B.; BERNATH, J., 2018, p.1. 
45 BUCKLEY-ZISTEL, S., 2014, p.3.  
46 ARTHUR, Paige – How" transitions" reshaped human rights: a conceptual history of 
transitional justice. Human Rights Quarterly, 2009, p. 363. 
47 JONES, B.; BERNATH, J., 2018, p.1-5. 
48 HANSEN, T. O., 2013. 





restorative, reparative or distributive, and discuss how particular 
transitional justice mechanisms correspond to these aims.49 
 The aims of transitional justice tend to vary depending on the context, 
but there are some constant features, such as the recognition of individuals’ 
dignity; the acknowledgment of violations and victims redress; and the 
focus on strategies to prevent them from happening again. These are the 
main points of transitional justice that can set the focus for its tools, while 
some complementary aims are pointed out by the International Center for 
Transitional Justice (ICTJ), such as: establishing accountable institutions 
and restoring confidence in them; making access to justice a reality for the 
most vulnerable ones in the aftermath of human rights violations; ensuring 
that women and marginalised groups play an effective role in the pursuit of 
a just society (using them as a tool, not just a secondary actor); 
implementing respect for the rule of law; facilitating peace processes and 
fostering durable resolution of conflicts; establishing a basis to address the 
underlying causes of conflict and marginalisation; and advancing the cause 
of reconciliation.50 
 Responding to these structural problems on behalf of the victims, in 
the form of distributive justice, symbolic reparations and many other social 
programs for the communities, not only repairs the harm suffered by victim-
survivors, but also prevents new cycles of violence.51 These forms of 
reparations generally consist of civil remedies (as opposed to criminal 
remedies) that are designed to redress harm resulting from an unlawful act 
that violates the rights of a person. In most domestic national settings, 
reparations are typically awarded pursuant to a court proceeding. In 
transitional justice settings, however, there are often too many victim-
survivors with potential claims for the courts to efficiently and effectively 
                                               
49 BUCKLEY-ZISTEL, S., 2014, p.6. 
50 THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE – What is Transitional 
Justice? 
51 LAPLANTE, Lisa J.; THEIDON, Kimberly Susan – Truth with consequences: Justice and 
reparations in post-Truth Commission Peru. Human Rights Quarterly, 2007, p. 240. 






handle, thus prompting governments to resort to administrative solutions. 
Such programs, often following a truth commission’s recommendations, 
attempt to provide an array of pecuniary and non-pecuniary measures to 
respond to the damage caused by conflict, repression, and political 
violence.52 
These tools are a key to achieve reconciliation, together with civil 
society and other non-State actors that can and should play an important 
role in shaping transitional justice solutions, acting as one of the tools in 
liberalising political transitions.53 These transitional justice instruments are 
aimed to promote peace building in post-conflict societies, supporting the 
victims and bringing them the recognition for their suffering. This doesn’t 
mean, nonetheless, that transitional justice has a transition towards 
democracy as a precedent to exist. In fact, the main characteristics of these 
devices is that it doesn’t require a transition to a liberal regime to be 
qualified as a transitional justice tool.54 
 In some cases, even, no fundamental political transition has taken 
place, at least in the moment when the justice procedures are launched. 
This category of cases is extremely diverse, ranging from societies such as 
Uganda or Colombia - which were still under armed conflict and serious 
human rights abuses when a transitional justice procedure was launched - 
to power-sharing and failed (or at least disputed) transitions - such as that 
in Kenya - and consolidated democracies - such as Canada, Australia and 
Brazil, that started a Truth Commission in 2011. Twenty-six years after the 
end of the dictatorship in 1985.55 These cases can hardly be understood 
and evaluated using a single framework, although there may be certain 
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similarities between them, including a disconnection between transitional 
justice and the pursuit of fundamental political change.56  
 Transitional justice tools are used in different political scenarios and 
stages in history. As discourses on transitional justice have moved to the 
very forefront of debates about democratisation, conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding, the enhanced normative power of the transitional justice 
paradigm seems to reflect an increased belief among important actors that 
the central question is no longer if something should be done after past 
human rights abuses, but how it should be done.57 It also acknowledges 
that the notion of transitional justice can be relevant to other types of cases 
besides liberalising political transitions, and recognizes that certain goals, 
such as addressing impunity and providing victims with redress, reoccur in 
many different contexts. Furthermore, transitional justice scholars - often 
emphasising an interdisciplinary approach to understanding the law’s 
ability to promote progressive societal change - have created useful tools 
to analyse accountability processes, truth-seeking and victims’ redress - 
tools that can be used to improve our understanding these processes in 
various contexts.58 All these devices are indispensable upon the healing 
process, seen that they are not necessarily linked with a transition, but still 
applied in many different situations, as long as new necessities appear in 
civil societies. 
 
2.3 - Healing with Transitional Justice. 
 
 Alongside their primary role in providing accountability for gross 
human rights violations, transitional justice interventions have gained 
growing recognition in recent years as key components of broader peace 
building and reconciliation efforts.59 The post-conflict period comes 
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together with a unique ‘transformative moment’ for reconciliation in divided 
societies, as the end of widespread conflict can offer an initial opportunity 
to restructure a divided society. Nevertheless, it is difficult for former 
enemies to begin to redefine their antagonistic identifications and 
relationships in order to establish a new regime. 60 In that sense, 
transitional justice interventions may serve solely to the purpose of social 
learning in transformative moments, since they often provide the first 
societal venue in which former antagonists are brought together in the post-
conflict environment to face the consequences of their violent past and to 
reconsider the grassroots of their relations with one another. 61 Thus, it’s 
possible to perceive that these crucial processes of social learning might 
be what ultimately serve as the central causal links mediating the 
relationship between transitional justice and reconciliation in divided 
societies.62 
 It’s imperative to understand, however, that this doesn’t indicate that 
transitional justice interventions represent a ‘magic bullet’, able to foster 
lasting intergroup reconciliation in divided societies. 63 Rather, it is argued 
that these interventions have the potential to serve as catalysts for the 
social and psychological processes through which former enemies can 
come to alter their perceptions and the nature of their relations with one 
another, and through this social learning, begin to create the conditions 
necessary to reconciliation and sustainable peace in divided societies.64 
This prompts several questions on what role transitional justice should play 
in divided societies, including the use of many different tools and how they 
can affect and solve problems, in order to advance these processes. A 
recent collection of conflict transformation in intergroup relations came to 
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the conclusion that reconciliation in deeply divided societies may ultimately 
require transitional justice interventions that are capable of promoting a 
combination of three distinct forms of social learning in order to achieve 
peacebuilding.65 
 The first of these social learning processes, instrumental learning, 
refers to the use of interventions designed to engage former antagonists in 
sustained cooperative interaction in a post-conflict period. This way, they 
can start to change their relationships and progressively learn to replace 
their hostility with trust, and their negative perception with a positive 
response of the others.66 
 Socioemotional learning, on the other hand, is an intervention 
developed to confront the perceptual and emotional inheritances from past 
conflicts as a way to break obstacles that are blocking reconciliation. These 
obstacles are usually caused mainly by feelings of guilt, scepticism, fear, 
and victimisation in segmented groups.67 
 Lastly, reconciliatory social learning in deeply divided societies will 
also require elements of distributive learning — interventions designed to 
ameliorate existing structural and material inequalities between divided 
groups that might otherwise continue to sustain intergroup antagonisms 
even in the absence of overt physical violence. 68 
 Together, all these tools, actors and theories can unpack the 
complex relationship between transitional justice and reconciliation in 
divided societies. Incorporated alongside the institutions and mechanisms 
designed to work with other ongoing societal efforts to rebuild relations and 
establish more equitable relationships between former enemies in divided 
societies.69 The theory suggests, essentially, healing mechanisms to 
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achieve peacebuilding in post-conflict societies and groups that aim to 
achieve peace with their past. 
To define the evolution of transitional justice, its changes through the 
decades were taken in consideration in this chapter, along with the 
importance of its tools and how they are applied in many different 
situations. In order to analyse the effectiveness of  transitional justice, 
however, the next chapter will examine truth commissions specifically, 
focusing on how they evolved, their role on dealing with the past and how 
they shape society while rewriting history




3- Background on Truth Commissions. 
 
 To deeply understand the impact and effectiveness of Brazil’s CNV, 
it is necessary to fathom the evolution of truth commissions through time. 
These commissions have as objectives, to adequately face the difficult task 
of policing the frontiers of truth and lie, opinion and factual information, and 
present and past, in order to produce a final report able to bring light to 
some of history’s darkest times.70 The decision to establish a truth 
commission surrounds many questions, especially concerning its necessity 
to deal with the past. In Brazil’s case, the CNV was brought to light after 
almost 32 years, but before its establishment, some unofficial truth 
projects71 and other governmental bodies attempted to deal with the past, 
though they did not reach out to society’s expectations.72 So what’s the 
reason for establishing truth commissions? Why are they different from 
other governmental or society’s initiatives? What powers do they have, and 
how are they efficient enough to achieve its purposes? How are they 
formed? What are their main objectives? 
 This chapter seeks to analyse the structure of truth commissions, 
tracing their definition and showing their role in political transitions. It will 
also elucidate the importance of truth in the healing process and detach 
the intrinsic characteristics that structure these independent bodies, while 
highlighting the powers given to them. 
Initially, it is important to have in mind that truth commissions are one 
of many transitional justice tools, used in order to create an official, 
accurate, detailed and impartial record about the past.73 They are defined 
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as a temporary body established with an official mandate in order to 
investigate past human rights violations, identifying patterns and causes of 
violence, and aimed to publish a final report while working through a 
politically autonomous procedure.74 
 This definition specifies five key components of a truth commission, 
that serve as fundamental characteristics to distinguish them from other 
investigatory bodies: a temporary body; the publishing of a final report; the 
focus on a limited number of past events; the autonomy from political 
intervention; and having an official mandate.75 
 The first characteristic, a temporary body, refers to its operation for 
a limited amount of time. Because of that, it is impossible to qualify 
permanent organisations, like Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO’s), 
parliamentary human rights commissions, or international bodies that 
protect human rights and seek to investigate past human rights abuses, as 
a truth commission.76 
 Second to that, a truth commission has as a result the publishing of 
an extensive report, making recommendations and summarising the main 
findings. This report is usually submitted to the political institution that 
issued the truth commission mandate, such as the president’s office, but it 
is important (and also a common practice) that the report becomes 
available for the general public as well, in different platforms such as the 
internet, publications, or other media platforms.77 In the case of this study, 
Brazil’s truth commission had the support of ‘amnesty caravans’ that since 
2008 are a part of an outreach program to insert the general public into the 
debates, and to reflect on the past in order to bring accessibility to regions 
with difficult access to information. Each caravan included cultural 
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seminars, public hearings, and the adjudication of applications for amnesty. 
As of June 2014, 86 caravans had been organised around the country.78 
Even though these caravans are not a result of the commission’s efforts, 
they worked alongside the CNV as a form of amplifying the range of its 
impact.  
 Next, the third characteristic is that truth commissions examine a 
limited number of past events and violations, that occurred on a specific 
time-frame established on its creation. This means that truth commissions 
do not investigate ongoing human rights abuses, and they do not only 
investigate  incidents of violence and violations through an individual 
perspective, but its patterns, causes, and consequences.79 In the Brazilian 
case, the commission concentrated its resources to address the massive 
human rights violations that were committed during the military rule, from 
1964 to 1985, although its mandate included  past human rights violations 
that occurred over the course of four decades (1946 to 1988)80, defined by 
law nº 12.528/11 in its Article 1.81 
 A truth commission has to enjoy complete autonomy from direct 
intervention of political actors that might influence the course of its works, 
being analogous to a judicial autonomy. That is the fourth characteristic, 
and it means that although they are created through a state’s support and 
ratification, other factors need to be taken into account, like its composition, 
together with the degree of financial, operational and legal autonomy.82 The 
crucial test for a truth commission’s autonomy is whether or not the political 
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decision makers alter the content of the final report, either during the 
commission process or at its end.83 
 Finally, the commissions are official in character, since either a state 
institution or an international organisation have to authorise the 
commissioners to assume the truth-finding task, giving them an official 
mandate. This allows them to enjoy greater access to information, security 
and increased assurance that their findings will be given more serious 
consideration.84 Because of this characteristic, non-governmental 
organisations can’t be classified as truth-commissions, since they lack an 
official mandate and their findings do not carry an official endorsement. But 
they can contribute to a truth commission with their expertise, 
representation (e.g. victims from marginalised sectors), and with 
engagement to achieve better results.85 
 After grasping its definition, the next step to holistically understand 
the role of a truth commission is to look at its evolution through time. 
Looking at the roots of its embodiment as a transitional justice tool is 
important to comprehend its usage and relevance. Therefore, knowing the 
evolution of the truth commissions is the next step in this research, as it 
seeks to achieve a broader understand of these tools, before narrowing its 
impacts to Brazil and Latin-America. 
 
3.1- Historical changes in Truth Commissions through the decades.  
 
 Truth commissions are no passing fashion86, and as of mid 2017 they 
were more than fifty around the world,87 that evolved through the Phases 
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of transitional justice to achieve different characteristics. It became then 
possible to classify most of them into three different categories: first-
generation transitional, second-generation transitional, and non-
transitional.88 The truth commissions from the first-generation transitional 
had an expressive start with the democratic wave that surrounded South 
America in the 1980’s. The region contains at least 12 of the almost 50 
countries that have utilised truth commissions in the past three decades.89 
Not only were these countries pioneers in applying  these transitional 
justice mechanisms  to investigate serious human rights violations, but they 
also served as pilots for the active involvement of the United Nations (UN) 
in peace processes during the post-Cold War period.90 All of these 
commissions were established within the first year of the democratic 
transition, showing the need to unfold the truth about the human rights 
violations before moving towards a new democratic rule.91 They emerged 
as a tool with characteristics of Phase II transitional justice models, 
showing the importance of unveiling the truth as a way to transition to these 
new emerging democracies. 
 The second category, second-generation transitional truth 
commissions, appeared during the mid-1990s and 2000s to address civil 
war and internal armed conflict between government forces and insurgent 
groups. Some examples include El Salvador, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Haiti, 
Nigeria, Peru, Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone, Guatemala, and Liberia, whose 
truth commissions were sometimes already working while domestic armed 
conflict was still happening, after several democratic/and or authoritarian 
regimes in these countries.92 
While the two categories above referred share a sense of 
immediacy, seen that most of them started in within one year of transition 
to peace and/or democracy, the second-generation commissions innovate 
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on being the first ones to receive significant foreign funding, as well as 
having foreign human rights activists and experts sharing expertise on its 
procedures and serving as commissioners. In some commissions - such 
as Guatemala93, East Timor94, Sierra Leone95, and Liberia96 - an UN 
backed peace accord took place, while others were started by international 
Non-governmental Organisations in the wake of internal conflict and 
authoritarian rule - such as Sri Lanka, Haiti, South Africa, Nigeria, and 
Peru.97  
Another change present in the second-generation truth commissions 
was a more active role in their sense of immediacy, since they not only 
happened in the aftermath, but also during violent conflicts. At this point, 
truth commissions had changed from domestic projects to an international 
- or even transnational - initiative, embodying some important aspirations 
in order to rewrite nations’ history, like the investigation of a wide range of 
violations; a detailed report with lengthy historical narratives that detailed 
the causes and consequences of the political violence; and the proposal of 
a series of extensive recommendations. 98  
 In the 2000s, a further transformation happened, when truth 
commissions were established under consolidated democracies. South 
Korea, Uruguay, Panama, Grenada, Chile, Paraguay, Ghana, Ecuador, 
Mauritius, the Solomon Islands, Brazil - which is the focus of this study-, 
Canada,99 Morocco (where a commission was created under a 
monarchical authoritarian regime),100 Indonesia and East Timor (who 
created a joint truth commission as a larger diplomatic move to strengthen 
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their relations) became part of what is known as non-transitional truth 
commissions, the third category.101 Here, human rights violations that 
ended more than a decade earlier (with the exception of the joint East 
Timor and Indonesia truth commission, that took place six years after the 
end of violations) were addressed. Because of their retrospective 
characteristic, these truth commissions went from transitional justice tools 
to post-transitional institutions.102 
 In the specific cases of Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil, official 
accounts of human rights abuses were created after over a decade of 
democratic rule, following previous unofficial attempts of accountability. 103  
Their focus, alike other non-transitional truth commissions, was on a wide-
range of human rights violations, identifying patterns and evolving the 
concept of truth commissions from investigating a narrow set of violations 
(that occurred on a recent conflict, and/or past-authoritarian rule) to a broad 
range of injustices.  
Another striking characteristic of the non-transitional commissions is 
the capacity to reach the interest of politically conservative sectors. While 
the first- and second-generation commissions were mostly established by 
centrist or center-left presidents, or as a result of peace accords, the third-
generation truth commissions incorporated a broader spectrum of political 
actors and ideologies. Although leftist and center-left presidents 
established them in Ecuador (Rafael Correa), Chile (Ricardo Lagos), Brazil 
(Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva), and Uruguay (Julio María Sanguinetti), 
Panama’s truth commission was established by a conservative president 
(Mireya Moscoso)104, Paraguay’s 2004 commission was dominated by the 
same Colorado Party that collaborated with the previous military rule105, 
and King Mohammed VI of Morocco established the Moroccan Equity and 
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Reconciliation Commission to investigate the massive human rights 
abuses during the reign of his father.106 This shows that the new truth 
commissions’ objectives, set up in consolidated democracies, were means 
of coming to terms with the distant - rather than the immediate - past, and 
their establishment wasn’t necessarily to serve as a basis for state-building. 
 After being familiarised with the definitions of truth commissions, the 
next step to understand this transitional justice mechanism is to look inside 
its creation procedures, including how its powers are set and to what extent 
they are used towards the accountability of the past.   
 
3.2 - How are truth commissions formed? 
  
 When civil society pressures the government on the formation of a 
truth commission, as a way to highlight its needs to deal with the past, a 
number of decision makers issue a mandate that can delineate the basic 
tasks and the organisational structure of the commission.107 The truth 
commission is created by a political decision-making procedure, that also 
designates part of (or all) the commissioners and support staff. This 
procedure also, sets the rules on how much discretionary power to grant 
the truth commission to conduct the investigation, since it needs 
autonomous power to achieve its goals as an independent body.108  
 The government establishes the mandate of a truth commission 
through their direct representative, but parliaments, high courts, or 
international organisations (such as the United Nations) have also 
sponsored truth commissions around the world.109 And while civil society 
groups may be set aside during the initial negotiation process of a truth 
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commission, opposition parties, insurgent groups, the military, and courts 
often participate in its creation, as decision makers or key veto players. The 
inclusivity in this initial process is a determinant factor of the truth 
commission’s impact, because it is the moment to set its goals, 
composition, and procedures.110 
 The commission’s mandate is traced by those key decision makers, 
and it settles the structure and outlines the commission’s terms of 
reference, such as the duration of the commission; sources of funding; its 
goals; how to conduct the investigation; the judicial powers given to it (to 
subpoena, to name perpetrators, to investigate documents, and so on); 
specification of the crimes and violations under investigation; and what 
period in time to investigate political violence and violations.111  
 Along with these specifications, the mandate also settles the powers 
given to a truth commission, through a wide range of judiciary powers that 
can change depending on the environment in which they operate, and the 
nature of human rights abuses they investigate.112 In some cases, like the 
South African truth and reconciliation commission, they can even be given 
amnesty powers,113 proving that the range of possibilities may vary 
depending on the context that the truth commission is inserted to. 
 Some of these powers, however, aren’t well seen within society, 
such as the exclusion of torture and exile from Chile’s 1990 National 
Commission on Truth and Reconciliation’s mandate, which was seen as a 
serious shortcoming by human rights activists.114 Showing the need for civil 
societies to participate in the first level of formation of truth commissions 
without society’s grassroots interest in confronting the past, the motivation 
to start a truth commission would not have existed, as they are formed from 
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civil society pressures on to the government115; because of that, society’s 
interests should be assessed in its creation rather than just assumed.116. 
 The powers given to a truth commission are established in order to 
achieve the goals and expectations traced in its creation, as a way to find 
truth and come together with its violent past. But why is the truth so 
important? What are the actual achievements of unveiling the historical 
truth? To answer these questions is to look at the truth as a mean to 
achieve the main objectives of transitional justice. 
 
3.3 - The Importance of the Truth. 
 
 In order to meet the challenges of transitional justice and achieve the 
objectives of a democracy that wants to move forward and towards a 
brighter future, a society needs to investigate, establish and publicly 
disseminate the truth about past human rights abuses. The means to reach 
this goal is to not only use what is known as forensic truth, which presents 
factual information about past atrocities and identifies the violators, but also 
give importance to emotional truth, which comes in the form of 
psychological and physical consequences of the abuses,117 and take into 
consideration the chain of command and historical factors that led into 
these violations and can explain them. 
 Victims and their descendants have a moral right to know the truth 
about the massive human rights abuses, but while they demand 
appropriate sanctions, it is impossible to apply them unless the 
identification of the perpetrators and the nature of their involvement is 
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officially acknowledged.118 Furthermore, reparations are only possible if the 
victims are correctly identified, along with the harms that they suffered119 
 While handling these tensions, re-writing the past and tracing the 
causal references for reparations, truth commissions serve as a platform 
for victims and perpetrators, offering for both of them opportunities that go 
beyond the spectrum of retributive justice. These commissions bring 
another valid form of justice, known as restorative justice, that focuses not 
only on penalties, punishment and retribution, but on recognising harm, 
encourage healing, and aiming for reconciliation as a part of the 
peacebuilding process. 120 And one of the mechanisms of accountability to 
reach reconciliation comes in the form of truth-telling. An essential way to 
heal the scars that still mark societies going through transition - or 
established democracies who didn’t achieve reconciliation with the ones 
affected by past human rights atrocities- is telling the truth. Which is a 
powerful way to overcome impunity for past human rights abuses.121 
 Truth-telling (or truth-seeking) is increasingly considered a vital 
component of the peacebuilding process, just as important as other steps 
such as disarmament, demobilisation, and the holding of post-war 
elections.122 Truth recovery is expected to enable a process of ‘national 
reconciliation’, as society comes together and finds a platform to hold their 
narratives accountable,123 which encourages social healing while 
promoting individual over collective guilt. As the truth about past crimes 
and human rights violations are exposed, individuals (not in the form of 
ethnic, cultural, religious, or military groups) are blamed for past atrocities, 
being either punished or forced to publicly admit their crimes, which puts 
an end to impunity. In that sense, the International Institute for Democracy 
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and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) includes truth-telling as one of the main 
necessary mechanisms to achieve reconciliation.124 
 In short, truth-telling is therapeutic.125 By exposing the truth of past 
crimes, victims and survivors can start the healing process from the trauma 
of war and finally receive some closure, while working towards reconciling 
with their former adversaries, and/or perpetrators. It is a process of national 
reconciliation and individual rehabilitation.126 Telling the truth about their 
wounds can heal the wounded and listening to these stories can help 
societies come to terms with their past,127 as the process of truth-telling 
becomes as important as the truth itself. 
Finally, as a result of this process, truth-telling also provides an 
official record of the past, by archiving a definitive word on the past and 
allowing adversaries to come together constructively in order to produce 
an authoritative report and reduce the number of permissible lies in public 
discourses.128 Educating the nation about the events of its past, along with 
the creation of a credible accountability of human rights abuses, allows 
society to prevent the repetition of such violence in the future.129 Having an 
official record of the past in combination with the recommendations 
elaborated by truth commissions will not only ensure the avoidance of 
human rights violations in the future, but also encourage the creation of a 
human rights culture.130  
 In the process of educating a nation about its past, truth commissions 
are a way to encourage peace through an institutional reform, as they 
reveal structural institutional pathologies that led to conflict or contributed 
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to wartime abuses.  Using tools such as vetting (also known as lustration) 
in order to remove the individuals responsible for these abuses from 
positions of power and authority, along with deterrence through criminal 
prosecution - which forces them to face public shaming even if they are 
exempt from criminal sanctions -, peace can be achieved.131 
 The importance of the truth on the healing process, therefore, can be 
seen in societies that are divided, in transition, and in established 
democracies with unhealed scars. The impact of truth-telling, its ability to 
achieve peace building, to start the healing process and the importance of 
its use to structure a government that passed through serious human rights 
abuses, had a powerful influence in the new democracies that surfaced 
Latin-America in the late eighties, having its reflexes until today. But did 
Brazil achieve its objectives on truth-telling? Was Brazil’s society 
“educated” about its past? 
In this chapter we traced the importance of the truth to achieve the 
goals set by the commissions in their creation, while analysing the evolution 
of these investigative bodies, and the role they play on the process of 
dealing with past human rights abuses. These independent bodies are 
formed to investigate and rewrite the truth, and to understand their 
objective is also to know what they are aimed to hold accountable. This 
raises questions on what events led into the formation of a truth 
commission. To answer this, the next chapter will focus on the historical, 
political and socio-economic placement of Brazil’s CNV, showing the 
events that led to its creation, structuring the background of Brazil’s 
massive human rights violations as a way to understand the importance of 
creating the CNV and answering questions on: why it was formed so late; 
what reasons blocked its creation; and whether or not there were attempts 
of accountability before the CNV
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4- The history of Human rights abuses in Brazil. 
 
 The emergency of Brazil’s dictatorship in 1964 wasn’t based only on 
an economic crisis, but a result of a political polarisation and radicalisation 
of the democratic regime that started in 1946.132 Understanding this 
background is important to have a clear critical response to the works of 
the CNV. Knowing the events under the scope of its mandate can lead 
towards a complete comprehension on why Brazil’s truth commission was 
established to investigate past human rights abuses that happened during 
these forty-four years.133 
 As a way to find these answers, this chapter starts with an 
socioeconomic, historical and political explanation of the main events that 
occurred between 1946 and 1988. Its objectives are to answer questions 
on what events were behind the massive human rights abuses in Brazil 
and who were the ones responsible for these past atrocities.  
To answer these questions, it is also important to analyse the socio-
economic and political changes in Brazil, along with the direct influences of 
global politics on a national level. Going through an investigation on the 
motives that led to the almost thirty-two years of impunity, questioning what 
motives were behind this negligence upon dealing with the past; whether 
or not it was just the result of a controversial Amnesty law; and whether 
there were any initiatives of accountability. 
Brazil is a continental country with a very young democracy that was 
formally restored only in 1985. Since then, successive democratic 
governments avoided the accountability of its violent past, assuring that 
this was an affirmation of the “transitional pact” established through the 
amnesty law and political peace accords that allowed the return to a 
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democratic state.134 This argument was backed up by the media and 
accepted by many sectors of Brazil’s society,135 creating a culture of 
impunity that persists until today (2018). 
Highlighting these historical and socio-economic aspects is a way to 
understand the causes that led the Brazilian state refusal to establish a 
systematic and official investigative body for almost thirty-two years, until 
changes in the political scenario led to a different approach to these 
problems, giving voice to the ones who suffered. But why did the 
government change its perception on dealing with the past? 
To answer this question, it’s important to remember that there were 
initiatives that surfaced from society, and others directly linked to the 
government. This research will discuss the works of the Brasil Nunca Mais 
initiative, showing an unofficial truth project that for years was the only 
initiative of accountability to these past human rights abuses.136 It was 
coordinated by the Catholic church, and led to the creation of a group 
formed by the families of the victims, whose works were acknowledged in 
the CNV’s report as an official source of information.137  
Another initiative was the creation of an Amnesty Commission, a 
Brazilian organ directly linked to the State that, since 2002, has decided 
over individual cases of financial and moral reparations, and collected 
substantial evidence of past human rights violations138. But to what extent 
are these groups really relevant on the road to accountability? What are 
the impacts of its activities on the works of the CNV? 
Dissecting these events and setting the causal references for the 
works of the CNV, while showing the steps that were taken before the 
establishment of a truth commission, are the next focus of this research as 
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this chapter finishes with a background on the early works of the CNV, 
setting the basis towards the examination of its procedures. 
 
4.1 - Human Rights abuses in Brazil, a brief History of events. 
 
 To understand the roots of the CNV’s proceedings, it is important to 
know the historical, political and socioeconomic context of the events that 
preceded the works of the commission from 1946 on.139 Between 1946 and 
1964, Brazil was under a fragile and unstable democracy, that came after 
a fifteen-year dictatorship (from 1930 to 1945) ruled by Getúlio Vargas. A 
period known as “era Vargas” had come to an end, but its reflexes still 
harvested through this new emerging democracy, which carried out a 
feeling of fear throughout society. As police forces were still aggressive and 
violent, abusing of power and institutionalising the belief that “those who 
detain the power, can do anything”140, a mindset spread through military 
forces.141 
 That period was also marked by the spread of the Union of the Soviet 
Socialist Republics’ (URSS) hegemony, and a fear of communism affecting 
Latin America created an anti-communism trend. And to maintain good 
relations with the United States of America (USA), some measures - such 
as making the activities of the Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB) 
[Brazilian Communist Party] illegal - became indispensable to the political 
order in Brazil.142 The years that followed represented the enforcement of 
military forces and conservative parties in Brazil’s political scenario. As they 
claimed to have an effective representation on it, they argued on the need 
to protect Brazil from any proximity of the international wave of communism 
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that started to spread, in consonance with the crescent USA influence on 
Latin America, which was well received by the armed forces, the 
conservative parties and Brazil’s corporate class.143  
 In 1961, Brazil was under the command of President Jânio Quadros, 
and his resignation triggered a severe political crisis, since his vice-
president, João Goulart, who was the direct successor according to the 
current Federal Constitution, was unacceptable to many high-ranked 
military officers.144 They considered João Goulart a dangerous politician 
because of his strong political ties with the left wing. Consequently, the 
military ministers tried to block his ascension as president by using the 
democratic means available to do it. They failed, but still had enough power 
to influence the congress to vote for a parliamentary system as a way to 
restrain his powers.145 Along with this political instability, an economic crisis 
was intensified, with some indicators showing that the deceleration in the 
industry was actually a secular decline. This led to an increase of the 
pressure on Brazil’s economy as it coincided with a declined capacity to 
gather international investment, specially from private resources.146 
 With the stagnation of the industry and the unattractive situation of 
the market for foreign investors, Brazil’s economic growth had a powerful 
decline, the inflation became out of control, and in the last months of 
Goulart’s government the prices were rising over one hundred percent.147  
This economic crisis, triggered by the previous political crisis, 
propitiated the military forces to become even stronger in the political 
scenario. They turned into the front line of the right-wing and got 
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international support (specifically from the USA148), along with support from 
many local and international investors, who saw an opportunity to change 
the politics along with the possibility of a new regime being installed. With 
support from society, that became unhappy with the government’s 
administration due to the crescent raises on inflation, poverty and 
unemployment,149 the moment was propitious for the military to present a 
new move. Using the Constituent Power to supply an institutional act that 
would rearrange Brazil’s normative scenario.150 
 On April 9, 1964 the Institutional Act number 1 (IA n. 1) was signed 
by the three military leaders: General Artur da Costa e Silva, Aviation 
Lieutenant Brigadier Francisco de Assis Correia de Mello and the vice-
admiral Augusto Hammann Rademaker Grunewald. In the IA n.1’s 
preamble151, they synthesized the reasons and the array of powers claimed 
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in order to form a new regime that started to rise at this point.152 On March 
31 a new government had emerged in Brazil, publicly recognized by the 
American president Lyndon Johnson just a few hours after the rise of the 
militaries.153 That initiated their reforms on the government administration, 
starting with a list of 102 names of congressman, militaries, unionists, 
diplomats and ministers whose terms were going to be withdrawn due to 
their progressivist vision.154 
 In 1968, the Institutional Act n. 5 was imposed, excusing the 
president from the Constitutional limitations that were set by the 1946 
Constitution. This act also provided powers that had never been granted 
before, such as the possibility to suspend political powers from any citizen 
in the country for ten years, and to revoke the term of any politician in the 
country. Additionally, it ended with many Constitutional guarantees, 
including the right to file a habeas corpus, an instrument used by both 
prisoners and those who were politically chased in order to guarantee their 
right to life and personal freedom.155 This not only shows the array of 
powers granted to the political leader, but also how the militaries controlled 
Brazilian society and were able to create a systematic culture of violence. 
 Along with all that political control, torture was used since 1964 in a 
greater or lesser extent by agents of the repression, and it did not disappear 
with the end of the armed organisations that opposed the government. 156It 
was used not only to obtain information, but also as a form of intimidation, 
deterrence, and to spread terror to the opposition forces. The repressive 
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system improved itself and became an institution, hitting mainly groups that 
were seeking to organise the working classes: labour unions, 
underprivileged neighbourhood associations, and priests and religious 
representatives that worked among them.157   
 Based on the military support, with the crescent investment of foreign 
capital - and eliminating or neutralising all the opposition forces158 - the 
government was able to develop an efficient economic policy to favour the 
big capital.  Without even working on a plan of distribution of income or 
considering the well-being of most of the Brazilian population, the 
government created an illusion of development among Brazil’s society. As 
the unemployment taxes went down, the economy got into its highest point 
in decades and the inflation became under control, which 159 made the 
“good citizens” (the ones that did not oppose the system) think that 
militaries in command were doing the right thing on exceeding their control 
over the media, the politics, the public administration, and so on. This 
spread a wave of fear, that translated into a false feeling of security,160 
which is one of the main reasons that lead towards the bad reception of 
Brazil’s CNV by part of the society. The reception of the CNV will later be 
examined in this research, and it shows why some Brazilians still claim for 
a return of the military dictatorship161, or even have a fond memory of this 
time. 
 In 1969 the General Garrastazu Médici became President. At this 
time, the military dictatorship reached its peak. The censorship was at its 
highest level, as any cultural manifestation had to be approved in order to 
be legally exhibited. All the public administration offices were under control 
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of the militaries, with a complex repression system, that intimidated union 
offices, churches, professional organisations and political parties. Any kind 
of public manifestation was prohibited, and the repressive measures had 
no limit, going from torture to assassination in order to achieve its 
purposes.162 
 Battling with the repression, there were two main fronts of resistance 
actively fighting in Brazil at this time. The first was called Ação Libertadora 
Nacional (ALN) [National Frontline of Liberty]. Its founder was Carlos 
Marighella, who created the Urban Guerrilla Manual, regarding the urban 
guerrilla as having a static role to distract the armed forces away from the 
remote areas and reduce the intensity of the operations against the rural 
guerrillas163 who were seen as the main tool to promote socio-political 
change. The second frontline of resistance formed the Araguaia Guerrilla 
War (1966-1974) and was the result of an insurrection planned by the 
Partido Comunista do Brasil (PCdoB) [Brazil’s Communist Party], an illegal 
political party at that time, that wanted to instigate a socialist revolution in 
Brazil, similar to those of China and Cuba. 164 
The Araguaia guerrilla group was formed by medical doctors, 
nurses, geologists, teachers, lawyers, commercial and banking 
professionals and, mostly, students. It had eighty-nine members, but since 
locals from the region also supported the group, the actual number of 
participants is uncertain.165  
 The government’s response to the guerrilla was to send troops to the 
region, in what was the second largest mobilisation of military personal in 
Brazil’s history (even exceeding the number of troops who were sent to the 
World War II). There were around ten thousand militaries, and they still 
struggled to suppress the insurrection.166 After this, a final campaign – from 
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October 1973 to September 1974 – offered bounties for the killing or 
capture of members of the guerrilla, while torture, dismemberment, 
decapitations and executions were used daily in the process. There is an 
estimative of 500 local people that were tortured and an unknown number 
that were killed, added to the official count of 136 deaths.167  
The extent of the political repression to its peak justifies the need of 
a truth commission, but it also confirms why it took so long for their voices 
to be heard. The ones that were affected by the military repression were 
mere members of society: students, local civilians, members of illegal and 
irrelevant political parties at the time, who were dominated by people with 
power. 
 In São Paulo, the military government’s response to the guerrillas 
was different from the ones in remote areas such as the Araguaia’s 
conflicts. The opposition figures were often ‘snatched’ or arrested, instead 
of being caught in open conflict. And as they were frequently tortured or 
killed, their remains were submitted to formal autopsy (creating fake reports 
to cover the traces of torture) before being buried in organised 
cemeteries168, issuing a death certificate that disguised the real cause of 
death. In São Paulo (the biggest zone of conflict), the victims were often 
buried in cheap wooden coffins marked with a “T” (for terrorist).169 
 These obscure times in Brazil’s history only came to an end in 1979, 
when the president João Figueiredo sanctioned the Amnesty law. The law 
n. 6.683 benefited 4.650 persons, between rebels, perpetrators and 
politicians in exile.170 The controversies of the Amnesty law will be further 
discussed, as its sanction was a mark on Brazil’s history, seen that it 
started a period of decline of the military dominance.171 As left oriented 
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political parties started to rise and in 1980, a law project that established 
direct elections was unanimously approved.172 In 1984, more than one 
million people went to the streets to ask for direct elections, starting a 
movement called “Diretas já”.173 The militaries had lost their power over the 
congress and in 1985 Tancredo Neves and José Sarney were elected by 
the national congress to be president and vice-president, in order to lead 
Brazil into a new democratic rule, that would start in 1988.174 
 The military rule left as a legacy a monstrous international debt and 
a disastrous economic situation, - including a galloping inflation and a 
severe recession -, along with a complicated relation between civilians and 
militaries in the public sphere, which had to be resolved in order to 
transition to a new regime.175 All these problems, along with the fear of 
prosecution, the tensions between the political groups, the controversial 
amnesty law and other important factors led to almost 32 years of silence. 
At this point, Brazil was just starting to rise as a young democracy, stepping 
into corpses that were left behind. 
 
4.2- 32 years of silence. 
 
 The military rule ended in 1985, but the civil and human rights176 
were only formally restored by the new constitution of 1988177. During these 
3 years of transition, there were no attempts of establishing an official truth 
commission to investigate the human rights atrocities that occurred in the 
former regime. As it was shown before, the ones who were affected by the 
repression were characterised as terrorists, communists that were against 
the political order, so they were left behind as the country advanced 
towards a new democracy. 178 
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The amnesty law extinguished the individual criminal responsibilities 
of both sides involved in the conflicts. But was this enough to achieve a 
closure with these past abuses? This is put into question, as the law also 
had a deterrent effect: creating a barrier that concealed any attempts to 
criminally prosecute the militaries.179 
In the thirty-two years that followed the fall of the military rule on 
1985, the successor democratic governments took a few steps to identify 
the victims and offer restitutions to their relatives. Between 1995 and 2011 
governmental bodies were established in order to investigate the alleged 
human rights violations of the military government, such as the Comissão 
Especial de Mortos e Desaparecidos Políticos (CEMDP) [the Special 
Commission on the Political Dead and Disappeared]180, and the Secretaria 
Nacional dos Direitos Humanos (SNDH) [the National Human Rights 
Secretary]181. Although these bodies focused on the accountability of these 
human rights abuses, their objectives were limited to clarifying the cases 
of human rights abuses and finding evidences on causes of death, 
concealment of bodies, and other information regarding these human rights 
violations, with no motivation towards having the perpetrators accountable 
for their crimes.182 
  In February 1978, the Comitê Brasileiro pela Anistia (CBA) [Brazilian 
committee for Amnesty] was founded to extend the amnesty process to 
political prisoners and exiled citizens. But they pointedly did not want to 
include amnesty for the perpetrators of human rights abuses, and despite 
the disapproval of the population, the National Congress passed the 
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amnesty law to all of those who between 2 September 1961 and 15 august 
1979 committed political crimes or crimes with political motivation.183  
 The amnesty law emerged as an attempt to re-establish relations 
between the military officers and regime opponents, including those who 
had been removed from the office, imprisoned, banished or exiled. 
Because it invoked notions of harmonisation and pacification, even people 
against the regime saw it as a way to deal with the impasse, in order to 
contribute with a future transition to democratic rule.184 But the law actually 
prioritised oblivion and the negation of truth, besides creating a tremendous 
obstacle for accountability because of its lack of specification on the range 
of the term ‘political crimes’. Since the term was open to interpretation, it 
was used as a way to guarantee impunity for state agents who committed 
serious human rights violations.185  
 In 2009 the Terceiro Programa Nacional de Direitos Humanos 
(PNDH-3) [Third National program of Human Rights] was published, 
containing a series of measures to be achieved in order to develop the 
human rights scenario in Brazil. The programme also contained an initiative 
to revise the 1979 Amnesty Law, and was spearheaded by Dilma 
Roussef186, who was serving as minister in the Casa Civil at that time. This 
initiative was presented to Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (Brazil’s president at 
that time) and Published in 2009, but it didn’t please the three military 
commanders or the minister of defence, who threatened to submit 
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resignation letters.187 At that time, Lula da Silva appeased the commanders 
and the minister of defence, offering to review the text of the Third National 
program of Human Rights. 
 Tensions from both sides were formed. The international human 
rights organisation, Global Justice, threatened to denounce Brazil before 
the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations (UN) if 
the PNDH-3 was not enforced, as it described the situation as a risk to 
democracy,188 saying that the program was altered after military forces 
blackmailed the president. The former minister of Human Rights, Paulo 
Sergio Pinheiro, who was a member of the group set up to modify the 
proposal, condemned the blackmailing of the president, although he denied 
that the changes in the PNDH-3 would affect the later works of the CNV.189  
 Besides the process of amnesty, another factor that led to the lack 
of accountability is that, in Brazil, serious crimes (such as torture, rape and 
homicide), are classified as ‘crimes of public initiative’. This means that only 
the Public Prosecutor’s Office has the responsibility to initiate such cases, 
and the prosecutors failed to do so. More so, private individuals, like 
families and relative of the victims, have very limited powers to attempt or 
challenge such inactivity of the public system, and if they do decide to claim 
their rights, they have to do it through the Public Prosecutor’s Office, which 
if free to decide if their complaints have merit.190 
 The media was also a significant obstacle on the accountability of 
human rights abuses in Brazil.  They exploited the governmental crisis that 
occurred in 2010, not only to attack the original proposal for the CNV, but 
also to discredit the government of Lula da Silva, as the Brazilian media is 
largely privately owned and often portrayed as conservative. 191 On 13 
                                               
187 BERTAZZO, Juliana. Brazilian Security and Defence Policy under President Dilma Rousseff: 
Transition and Initial Challenges, 2012, p. 815. 
188  BERTAZZO, J., 2012 p. 816. 
189 MEHL, Gustavo – EBC: Justiça Global denunciará Brasil na OEA e na ONU se o PNDH for 
revisto, 2010. 
190 SKAAR, E.; GARCIA-GODOS, J.; COLLINS, C., 2016. p. 109. 
191 SKAAR, E.; GARCIA-GODOS, J.; COLLINS, C., 2016. p. 109. 




January 2010, the magazine Veja (one of the biggest magazines in Brazil) 
published an article entitled Coisa de maluco [‘Matter of a madman’]. The 
article had a picture of Paulo Vannuchi, the Brazilian Minister of Human 
Rights at the time, with the caption ‘Not Human: The Federal minister Paulo 
Vannuchi, ex-militant of a terrorist group and drafter of that decree: if it did 
not work with a revolver, he’ll do it with a pen’. This headline satirizes the 
PNDH-3 created by Vannuchi, which contains 521 suggestions to improve 
the human rights situation in Brazil, with a key proposal to create the 
CNV.192 
 In April 2010, Brazil’s Supreme Court ruled a decision on the ADPF 
153193, an action regarding the human rights abuses from the military 
dictatorship that was filed by the Federal Council of the Brazilian Bar 
Association. The action discussed the Article number 1 of the amnesty law, 
that granted amnesty to crimes of any nature, as long as they were either 
related to political crimes or practiced by public motivation.194 The action 
questioned if the law was well received by the national constitution of 1988 
and the range of the amnesty that was granted. Brazil’s Supreme Court 
decided to maintain the amnesty law, ruling that it was a tool used in 
transition to the new democracy, achieving its conciliatory purposes.195 The 
ruling closed the possibilities of punishment even further, and went against 
the decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the process 
filed by the families of the missing.196  
Finally, in October 2014, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
of the Organisation of American States resolved that its ruling to the 
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process on the Araguaia War - which was to punish the perpetrators 
responsible for the violations and to apply the penalties provided by law -
wasn’t complied by the Brazilian government..197 Because of that, the 
Brazilian government had violated the Articles 1(1), 4, 8, 12, 13 and 25 of 
the American Convention on Human Rights198 and Articles I, XXC and 
XXVI of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (as 
Brazil was signatory of these conventions he was responsible for protecting 
them).199 These articles are related to rights to liberty, security and life, as 
well as the due legal process and fair trial, equality before the law, and 
freedom of conscience, though, religion and expression. 
The Court also resolved on the Amnesty law that granted immunity 
to the offenders even though their crimes were imprescriptible, stating that 
the law continues to interfere with their criminal liability even though the 
officers committed abuses that were incompatible with the American 
Convention on Human Rights.200 
 The facts above exposed lead to the identification of barriers of 
accountability in Brazil, such as the existence of a culture of impunity; 
processual barriers from within the judiciary branch; the myth that the 
militaries were in a “civil war” against “terrorist groups”; and the lack of an 
efficient vetting process –  permitted the state to be influenced by those 
who were guilty of these past events.  
Despite all these barriers, however, the early works of the CNV would 
start in the subsequent months. As we move forward to analyse the road 
to accountability, it’s necessary to point out the attempts to investigate 
these massive human rights abuses, in order to know the ground on which 
the commission was set. 
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4.3- Starting to heal, the road to accountability. 
  
After the end of the military dictatorship, a healing process - along 
with its challenges - was left aside while Brazil moved towards establishing 
a new Democratic government. In that sense, the amnesty law created a 
feeling of impunity in Brazil’s society. As this research moves forward to 
analyse the CNV’s proceedings, it is necessary to clarify the works of the 
investigatory bodies and other entities that contributed to the accountability 
of the past human rights abuses during the dictatorship. Their contribution 
was acknowledged by the CNV],201 and used as a starting point to the 
process of unveiling the truth. 
 When Brazil started a new democracy, names were thrown into 
oblivion, along with their reputation, as they were seen as terrorists who 
went against the political order. Those people’s families were humiliated 
and had nowhere to claim their rights, since the government did not want 
to start an official body to investigate these crimes. In that context, under 
the pretext of reviewing cases for the new amnesty law, a group of lawyers 
gained access to the transcripts of cases brought before the military courts 
between 1964 to 1979, initiating an unofficial truth project.202 
 Soon it became clear that the archives were not well monitored, and 
the lawyers involved in the investigation process started to copy the entire 
archive of the military cases (more than a million pages). With these files, 
they formed a 2,700 pages investigative report, named Brasil: Nunca Mais 
[Brazil Never Again]. This was the first attempt to account the massive 
human rights abuses.203 The whole process was made in secrecy. Those 
who were photocopying the documents had no idea of the significance of 
their actions, and all the photocopies were transferred to concealed places, 
together with a microfilm copy that was later sent to a place outside Brazil 
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to ensure that the information would be secure. There was no publicity or 
marketing strategies for the report, and the only author credited was 
Cardinal Paulo Evaristo Arns, from the Archdiocese of São Paulo.204 
 The archive was initially 6,946 pages, separated in a twelve-volume 
series of data, but two professional journalists made a concise version to 
be published, so it could be accessible to the general public. The book was 
launched across the nation on 15 july 1985, together with an English 
translation named “Torture in Brazil”.205 
 Brasil: Nunca Mais proved that torture was the basis of the military 
“justice system”, and all the authorities were aware of its use in order to 
extract confessions. The book remained on the bestseller list for twenty-
five weeks. Although the project had a list of 444 torturers that were named 
in the military courts, their names were excluded from the publication due 
to the volatile political climate at that time.206 The list was eventually 
released to the public, and some of those names were removed from public 
offices, demoted or block from promotion.207 This unofficial truth project is 
best understood as an attempt to replace a Truth commission, as it was 
unlikely, at that time, to establish an official body. But the torturers exposed 
by Brasil: Nunca Mais have never been held directly accountable for their 
crimes.208 
 When it first emerged, in 1978, the amnesty movement called for the 
members of Brazil’s security forces to be criminally responsible for their 
crimes, but since the end of the military rule this demand has gradually 
disappeared, even from the public discourses of the victims and their 
families. This shows that the feeling of impunity and the lack of faith in the 
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legal system are a reflex of the military’s regime success in persuading the 
society to forget about the human rights atrocities.209 
 In 1996, a state-run commission called Comissão Especial sobre 
Mortos e Desaparecidos Políticos (CEMDP) [Special Commission on the 
Dead and Disappeared for Political Reasons] was created by the Law of 
Disappeared as a form to do accountability of those who were murdered 
by the dictatorship. The members of the CEDMP represented a diverse 
group. They were appointed by the president and included representatives 
from the armed forces, the Federal Prosecution Service, from victims’ 
families, the armed forces, the Foreign Ministry, civil society organizations, 
and the Human Rights Commission of the Chamber of Deputies.210 
 The CEMDP was set up as an agency of the Brazilian state, not 
directly subordinated to the government. It operated more independently 
with a mandate aimed to acknowledge the cases of disappearances that 
were not listed in Appendix I of the Law of the Disappeared, locating their 
bodies and assessing requests for compensations.211 Initially the CEMDP 
focused on obtaining death certificates for the victims, because in most 
cases, they were either forged in order to hide the true causes of death, or 
didn’t even exist. Also, the amnesty law only allowed for a ‘declaration of 
absence’ to be issued for disappeared persons, which could be used as a 
certificate of presumption of death - for the purposes of resolving 
inheritance issues and dissolving marriages.212 
 The CEMDP’s did not investigate the causes of death, nor did it hold 
the perpetrators accountable for their crimes. Its work focused on the 
disappeared, by creating a DNA database with the blood of the victims’ 
families, issuing death certificates, gathering information on the possible 
location of clandestine graves (especially in the region of the Araguaia 
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river) and improving the scientific accuracy in the identification of mortal 
remains and skeletons.213 Its contribution to truth was recognised through 
a publication called Direito à memória e à verdade [Right to Memory and 
Truth], which summarises the work of the CEMDP, presenting stories of 
the fatal victims of the dictatorship. It was the first official document of the 
Brazilian state to impute to members of the security forces (in a general 
way, not as individuals) the crimes of torture, dismemberment, 
decapitation, rape, concealment of corpses and the murder of defenceless 
opponents who already were in jails,214 besides discrediting earlier official 
propagandas that the victims committed suicide or were killed because 
they attempted to escape while imprisoned, or during armed confrontation 
with the police.215 
In 2001, a list of named torturers was presented before the United 
Nations Committee Against Torture by a Brazilian NGO called Tortura 
Nunca Mais [Torture Never Again]. The Brazilian government, under the 
pressure of the UN, promised to investigate the matter, but there was no 
official action about it, even after the list was refined to contain only the 
torturers that still held a high position in the state office.216  As a result of 
this attempt, Amnesty International described Brazil’s lack of accountability 
as “a telling case study of how total impunity for human rights violations 
under military rule (1964-1985), has led to a culture of impunity, to the 
extent that it threatens the very rule of law”217. As of today, with the 
exception of a case that occurred in 1997, where two police and eight 
military officers were sentenced by a military court for torturing fourteen 
soldiers (four of whom died as a result), no State agent (civilian or military), 
has ever been punished for past human rights violations.218 
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 When Lula da Silva became president, representing those who were 
victims of the military dictatorship, he established a working group to draw 
the law that would create an official truth commission, sponsored by the 
government. With a strong support of the society, the CNV was created 
under the Law 12.528, and was approved unanimously at the end of the 
president’s term.219 However, the works of the CNV only started on 16 May 
2012, when the new president, Dilma Vana Rousseff, launched the 
National Truth Commission in a ceremony attended by her four civilian 
predecessors.220 
 Rousseff was a former political prisoner, and a survivor of torture. In 
her speech, she called upon Brazil’s society to acknowledge and 
understand the country’s full History.221 The work of the CNV started as a 
hope for those who had been forgotten, as it aimed to finally acknowledge 
the factual history of Brazil’s military dictatorship, name torturers and 
victims, show the truth, and publicly recognise the suffering of those who 
lived through decades of impunity. 
This chapter enabled the introduction of some of the challenges 
faced by the CNV, including the need to break an immaculate perception 
of the military dictatorship that was spread through Brazil’s society.222 One 
of the biggest challenges of the commission is to rewrite the historical 
narratives of the country’s past. But it also shows the actual impact of its 
work.223 With this clear historical background of the events that led to the 
works of the CNV, this research moves on to analysing the procedural 
aspects of Brazil’s CNV. 
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5 - Brazil’s Truth Commission (CNV). 
 
 To meet the challenges of transitional justice, a society must 
establish, investigate and publicly disseminate the truth about past human 
rights abuses.224 To achieve that, truth commissions emerge to present the 
factual information, or what Alex Borraine - who served as the Vice 
President of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commissions - calls 
“forensic truth”.225  This research has so far explored the road towards 
achieving this forensic truth, explaining the evolution of transitional justice 
itself and showing the different aspects and challenges of truth 
commissions as they evolved through time. 
After tracing this background on transitional justice and focusing on 
the truth commissions as a mean to both achieve accountability and deal 
with past human rights abuses, the research showed how the events in 
Latin America shaped transitional justice internationally. Earlier chapters 
also explored the foundations of the massive human rights abuses in Brazil, 
clarifying the historical and socioeconomic factual information that led into 
the need to create the CNV, and studying some of the early works of the 
commission while giving attention to the initiatives that came before the 
instalment of this official body.  
This chapter will, therefore, analyse the proceedings and the 
structure of Brazil’s truth commission, as it goes through the aspects that 
guided its work and defined its mandate. From its creation process to the 
publication of its final report, this study will clarify questions like what the 
main objectives of Brazil’s CNV were; if its mandate had the powers 
required to achieve them; and what were the positive and negative impacts 
of the CNV’s technicalities. 
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  To answer these questions, it is essential to look deeply into the 
CNV’s structure with a critical approach, in order to set the grounds to move 
towards the analysis of its impact and effectiveness. The mandate of a truth 
commission specifies an array of violations to be examined by the 
commission and settles the logistical and organizational issues – such as 
sources of funding and the time period of investigation –.226 which are the 
foundations of its work. Therefore, by showing all the technical aspects of 
the CNV – from its objectives and powers to its mandate –, it is possible to 
understand the outreach of the commission, as well as the limits that were 
imposed to it.  
 It is also mandatory to go through an analysis of the truth 
commission’s staff, their influence and relevance on society while paying 
attention to the fact that the commissioners are appointed by political 
decision makers. In that sense, it is important to analyse their role and if 
they appease the social pressure on establishing an impartial truth-finding 
procedure.227 Another crucial point in that analysis is the time period for 
investigation and its importance for the process of investigation. Did the 
commissioners have enough time to achieve their goals? 
 Finally, it is significant to show the transparency of the process and 
how the access to its proceedings was done, while keeping in mind that 
one of the key claims of truth commissions is to pay attention to 
experiences and memories that were forced into oblivion.228 Did the CNV 
promote accessibility to the general public?All the above mentioned will be 
essential to examine the Final report, allowing us to judge its proximity to 
the public, and how the recommendations were traced. These 
technicalities are important to evaluate the works of a Truth Commission, 
as they are multi-factor bodies that seek to transcend the existing data of 
                                               
226 BAKINER, O.,2014, p. 49. 
227 BAKINER, O., 2014, p. 51. 
228 BAKINER, O., 2014, p. 73. 






social memory, showing a way to grant access and visibility to individuals 
and social groups that were silenced by powerful dominant figures.229    
 
5.1- The CNV’s structure. 
 
 The impact of the CNV and its efficiency in dealing with the past 
emerges in this section, with an analysis on the commissions’ trajectory as 
a way to identify some important elements that will later trace the 
effectiveness of its work. These elements are the civil-society participation; 
the positive and negative aspects of its proceedings; how the truth 
commission overcame the obstacles that appeared during the mandate; 
the impartiality of its work, among others, and they will set the ground for a 
later critical approach on the truth commission’s impact.  
 Truth commission impact is the consequential effect of a truth 
commission on judicial processes, government policy, social norms, and 
society. It has a direct causal effect, operated regardless of other 
simultaneous outcomes of post conflict institutions and other transitional 
justice tools.230 But to exactly identify the causal effects of the truth 
commission on society, the state and the judicial system, it is first 
mandatory to holistically understand its proceedings and structure. 
  This section aims to identify key components of the truth 
commission that can bring a critical approach to all plausible causal 
explanations of how it was able to produce impact in society. 
 
5.1.1 - Objective, powers and mandate. 
 
 Brazil’s National Truth Commission was established through an 
action of Brazil’s legislative power, which makes a significant difference 
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from other Latin-American truth commissions. 231 It was a presidential 
decree from President Dilma Roussef232 that officially started the works of 
the CNV. While this might seem positive, it actually is one problematic 
aspect of its formation. Generally, the commission’s creation should be 
ratified by the Congress rather than inaugurated by a presidential decree, 
however, its installation was contested through different political groups 
within the state. In that sense, it is important to keep in mind that the political 
scenario in Brazil still had a strong presence of many members of the 
dictatorship, as there were no vetting processes through the years that 
followed the end of the military rule.233 
Another result of these political tensions was that the legal mandate 
of the CNV was therefore adapted to ensure its ratification, which is shown 
by the change of terms like “political repression” to “political conflict”.234  
There was also a change in the timeframe of the investigation, as it covered 
a period beyond the dictatorship (1964-1985), from 1946 to31988. That 
seems to be a manoeuvre to disguise its focus on the dictatorship years,235 
especially because, after the establishment of the CNV, the commissioners 
officially decided to aim their work on the period of the military rule.236  
 These frictions within the government are a reflection of the extent 
to which Brazil is trying to come to terms with the legacy of the military rule. 
This is a direct result of the collective culture of denial, where memory was 
reduced to a private remembrance of families affected by the political 
repression.237  
 The CNV’s main objective, according to law 12.528, was to realise 
the right to historical memory and truth, in order to promote national 
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reconciliation’238. To achieve them, its mandate was established with 
powers to clarify cases of enforced disappearances, torture and 
concealment of corpses, inside and outside national territory; identify 
perpetrators, whenever it was possible; reveal the locations, structures, 
institutions, circumstances, and the consequences of the massive human 
rights abuses; and forward to the prosecutors’ office or the judiciary any 
relevant information that could be helpful in locating the mortal remains of 
the victims.239 The law also defined the competence of the CNV, declaring 
that it could investigate all the serious human rights violations practiced in 
the time frame of 1946 to 1988,to clarify the factual circumstances even if 
the crimes were committed outside national territory.240 
The competence to investigate violations that occurred outside 
national territory opens the possibility to investigate crimes that happened 
not just as a result of persecution or homicides, but also crimes that were 
indirectly caused by other abuses - such as the exile - or as a result of any 
cooperation of the oppressive regimes at the time.241 This show how 
ambitious the CNV was, as it refers to serious human rights violations that 
occurred on a spectre of more than forty-two decades, in any part of the 
world, as long as they were committed to Brazilian citizens and as a result 
of the political processes of that period in history.242 
 This extended time frame, the scope to investigate crimes even 
outside national territory, and the restrained resources (only seven 
commissioners), were deeply problematic circumstances. The CNV was 
actually projected to be something bigger than its reach, which shoes a 
bigger focus on appearances than on the real needs of the process of 
investigation. This will be proven in the next section of this research, as we 
go to the analysis of the CNV’s staffing. 
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 The Commission was composed of seven members appointed by 
Dilma Rousseff (Brazil’s President at the time). This decision to arbitrarily 
choose the members of the commission set aside any participation of 
society’s groups and families of the victims, who actively worked through 
the years that preceded the CNV’s creation on the accountability of the past 
human rights violations during the dictatorship.243  As a reaction to this lack 
of public participation, protests and public manifestations were organized 
by some families of the victim’s groups, showing their discontentment with 
the selection process.244 
Because of that, the members were required to be recognised by 
their work in the defence of human rights, democracy and constitutional 
institutions. Although that was achieved, the lack of public participation 
perpetuates a feeling of neglection that could be avoided. This can be 
confirmed by an official document published by the ICTJ and the Amnesty 
Commission, stating that the commissioners should have been selected 
through a transparent selection process, preferentially with a consultation 
that promoted the participation of different sectors of the civil society, 
specially victims and other vulnerable groups.245 
The nominated members were Claudio Lemos Fonteles, former 
general attorney of the Republic; Gilson Langaro Dipp, minister of the 
Superior Tribunal of Justice; José Carlos Dias, lawyer of political prisoners 
and former minister of justice; José Paulo Cavalcanti Filho, lawyer and 
former minister of justice; Maria Rita Kehl, psychoanalyst and journalist; 
Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, professor of political sciences at the University of 
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São Paulo (USP); and Rosa Maria Cardoso da Cunha, criminal lawyer and 
advocate of  political prisoners. In October 2012, Gilson Dipp stepped aside 
from his position due to health problems, and in June 2013, Claudio 
Fonteles renounced his position as a CNV member, being substituted in 
September by Pedro Bohomoletz de Abreu Dallari, lawyer and professor 
of international law in the Institute of International Relations at USP.246 It’s 
noticeable that most of the commissioners (five) were legal experts, 247 
which left historians, experts for the armed forces and investigative 
journalists aside, being another problem in the CNV.248 
Truth commissions are multi-disciplinary bodies, that need a diverse 
group of experts and representation from different sectors of the society. 
This becomes clear as the final report of the commission was not an 
attractive source of information to the general public, which could be due 
to the lack of investigative journalists.249 
On the other hand, aside from these official members, there were 
217 collaborators directly involved in the works of the CNV, including 
assessors, public employees, consultants, researchers, technical and 
administrative assistants, interns and volunteers. They worked in the head 
office in Brasilia, and offices in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.250 This was 
a positive point in the truth commission’s staff, as Brazil is a continental 
country and the military repression affected its entire territory, making the 
role of holding all these historical facts accountable an impossible task to 
be done by only seven commissioners. 
 The CNV’s staff was organised into 13 different working groups, 
each focusing on a distinct theme.251 The Commission conducted 80 public 
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audiences and hearings in 14 of the 26 states, and the federal district. The 
importance of starting these activities was clear as the CNV’s creation 
highlighted the latent demand for truth, encouraging the creation of 100 
other state or institutional truth commissions around the country252. These 
local commissions were a really positive initiative, making Brazil a pioneer 
in launching the system of local truth commissions, a completely new 
development in the history of truth commissions.253 However, although the 
CNV’s mandate enabled it to coordinate its work with other public agencies 
and institutions, such as the CEMDP, the Amnesty Commission, and the 
National Archives,254 it only signed official collaboration agreements with 
43 of these commissions.255 
 Many local commissions provided information and supported the 
works of the CNV, broadening the scope of its work, but others challenged, 
criticised and contested its findings.256 An example of conflicting 
commissions was the dispute between the CNV and the Vladimir Herzog 
municipal truth commission of São Paulo, which raised doubts on the 
circumstances that led into the death of former president Juscelino 
Kubitschek. His death is officially stated as caused by a car accident, based 
on hearings and evidences collected in 1996, but the local commission 
opened the case and reached the conclusion that the former president was 
actually murdered in a politically motivated crime257 The final report of the 
CNV rejected the findings of the local commission, arguing that it lacked 
                                               
people; 9) Operation Condor; 10) the role of the churches in the dictatorship; 11) military 
persecutions; 12) violations of human rights to Brazilians outside national territory; 13) the 
military-dictatorial State. BRAZIL; BRASIL; VERDADE, Comissão Nacional da, 2014a, p. 51. 
252  SKAAR, E.; GARCIA-GODOS, J.; COLLINS, C., 2016, p. 119 
253 These local truth commissions followed their own time-line, with no direct attachments to the 
CNV, continuing or starting their work even after the delivery of the CNV’s Final Report. At the 
time of the final report, there were more than 100 local commissions acknowledge by the CNV in 
BRAZIL. BRASIL; VERDADE, Comissão Nacional da, 2014a, p. 23. 
254 Lei nº 12.528, 2011. Article 4. 
255 SKAAR, E.; GARCIA-GODOS, J.; COLLINS, C., 2016, p. 118. 
256 SCHNEIDER, N. DE A., G. I., 2018, p. 641. 
257  The local commission found evidence on the coffin of the former president’s area. The 
evidence consisted on a metallic material in the cranial area of the coffin, what could be the 
remains of a bullet, but the CNV remained with the theory that this material came from the nails 
in the coffin. To see more information on this conflict, read ABREU, Carmen Regina – A disputa 
entre as Comissões da Verdade pela versão final sobre a morte de JK, 2016. 






sufficient proof.258 The conflict then escalated to a judicial order that was 
filed in 2014, accusing the CNV of abusing its power. Following the denial 
of the request on federal court, the local commission publicly criticised the 
positioning of the CNV for holding the narrative of Kubitschek death as an 
accident.259 
 This incident exemplifies that different state-level commissions (that 
are not directly linked to the national commission, and therefore not 
subordinated to it) can strongly challenge how the official historical facts 
ought to be told260, and even get in the way of the investigatory processes. 
It shows that the initiative to create local commissions was a positive 
attempt, but the lack of hierarchy could be problematic. 
 The CNV staffing, along with the pioneer initiative on local 
commissions, showed the particularities of the CNV and how its formation 
influenced the investigatory process. Appointing the commissioners is a 
critical decision on the works of a truth commission, and though the CNV 
lacked experts from different backgrounds, the choices made by President 
Dilma Rousseff were based on public figures with a good commitment to 
human rights protection, showing a positive intention on the formation of 
the commission. 
 
5.1.3- Time period for investigation. 
 
The CNV, at first, was supposed to have a limited mandate of two 
years, from 16 May 2012 to 16 May 2014. Due to a request from survivors 
and relatives, however, President Dilma Rousseff, increased the time in 
seven months, which meant its mandate officially ended on 16 December 
2014, along with the publication of the final report.261The short mandate 
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conflicted with the large scope of investigation (from 1946 to 1988)262, 
which raised a question on the actual capabilities of this truth commission 
to achieve its purpose. Because of that, as previously mentioned in this 
research, the commissioners ended up narrowing their investigative focus. 
And another, more apparent, problem that was raised in its creation was 
the fact that the CNV did not have any time to structure its work, and the 
commission spent almost one year just to create a modus operandi and set 
a support team that would work along with the commissioners.263 
The designated term of two years (eventually increased by seven 
months) and the lack of a period to structure the work before the beginning 
of the activities proved to be insufficient to allow a deep investigation of all 
the massive human rights abuses committed in a country with continental 
proportions.264 However, the CNV overcame these limitations, deciding to 
focus only on the years of the dictatorship, and firming collaboration with 
other investigative bodies throughout the country. 
Bearing that in mind, an analysis of the transparency and access to 
information in the investigation process is needed. 
 
5.1.4 - transparency and access to information. 
 
 The activities of the CNV were widely promoted through the creation 
of a communication department. This was a very positive initiative, as all 
the hearings, proceedings and the collecting of testimonials were 
previously informed to the press, and the members of the commission put 
themselves at the disposal of journalists.265  The need for that comes from 
the fact that the media in Brazil is privately owned by conservative 
companies who tend to be against the human rights promotion. Because 
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of that, at the end of the activities, press conferences were organised to do 
a public follow up of the proceedings, and to clarify any misleading 
information.266 Furthermore, the CNV published public notes manifesting 
its position on relevant themes, such as the exhumation of the President 
João Goulart, in November 2013267; the fifty years of the 1964 coup, in 
March 2014268; and the response of the armed forces to the CNV’s 
requirement about the investigation on the misuse of its installations as 
torture centres during the dictatorship, in July and September 2014.269 
 Whenever it was possible, the CNV recorded all its activities, or at 
least took videos and pictures to register its work. The media was 
transmitted through its channels on YouTube270, Facebook271, Twitter272, 
and after 10 May 2013 all its public audiences and hearings were 
broadcasted live and in high definition through the internet.273 
 The CNV also produced a variety of outputs such as a web page 
containing a series of audio and video recordings, as well as the archives 
of all the materials gathered by the commission. This was later integrated 
into the Brazilian national Archives274 along with the reports and outputs of 
local commissions; artistic and cultural events created in response to the 
CNV’s work; and the media coverage of the truth commission.275 
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 Another measure to get closer to the general public was the creation 
of an ombudsman agency to: a) receive information and contributions from 
the citizens; b) attend and direct the general public demands; c) answer 
the demands presented to the Commission, representing the ones 
responsible for them; d) structure and maintain the public  service 
mechanisms; e) create and update the management instruments, 
according to the definitions of the CNV’s executive secretary; f) elaborate 
its own activities schedules; g) assist the witnesses hearings when 
necessary.276 
 The ombudsman agency’s main objectives were to achieve the 
administrative transparency of the proceedings, and to serve as a channel 
to receive collaboration from the public in general. Acting as a mediator 
between the citizens and the Commission, it aimed to attend the demands 
for information, and to receive reports about human rights violations that 
could contribute to the process of investigation. The agency provided many 
methods of contact, like an institutional email, conventional letters, a face-
to-face service, an online form on the CNV’s official website, and other 
forms of access channels.277 
 All these initiatives on publicizing and giving transparency to the 
proceedings of the commission were positive ways to handle the public’s 
attention, and to try to include society in the process of investigation. But 
even though the CNV tried to establish a diverse array of mechanisms to 
contribute with the investigation, and despite its wide reach, some groups 
still raised occasional criticisms on the transparency and effectiveness of 
the participatory mechanisms in the CNV’s operations. 278 
 The creation of social media channels, the live broadcasts of the 
proceedings and the diverse set of participatory mechanisms showed that 
the CNV was concerned on being accessible to the general public. And 
when we come to think that one of the key objectives of a truth commission 
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is to give voice to the memories and experiences that were forced to stay 
in oblivion,279 the possibility to participate of these proceedings was a very 
positive initiative. However, sometimes the general public does not 
understand the technical approaches of the commission, or even it 
purposes, which raises the fact that the general public does not speak the 
same language of the commissioners, experts and those involved in the 
works of a truth commission. Because of that, the accessibility of its final 
report - another important factor - will be further discussed in this research. 
 
5.1.5- Final Report. 
 
 The CNV’s final report presented four conclusions, but since the first 
three are interconnected – as they refer to the confirmation that the 
Brazilian dictatorial State committed serious human rights violations, 
according to international humanitarian law –, they can be analysed 
together.280  
After being presented with hundreds of narratives and statements of 
human rights abuses, the CNV concluded that a  systematic practice of 
illegal detentions, tortures, execution, enforced disappearances, and other 
violations by State agents, especially during the military dictatorship, had 
taken place.281 Based on a pattern that was traced through the investigation 
of the violations and the chain of command of those actions, the CNV 
proved that these violations were the result of widespread and systematic 
actions of the State, which were conceptualised and implemented through 
decisions arising from the presidency of the republic and the military 
ministers.282 This conclusion refuted the official statement of the militaries, 
                                               
279 BAKINER, O., 2016, p.73. 
280 First conclusion, which confirmed ‘the evidence of massive human rights violations’, BRASIL; 
VERDADE, Comissão Nacional da, 2014a, p. 962. 
281 Second conclusion, which confirmed ‘the existence of a generalized and systematic 
character of massive human rights violations’, BRASIL; VERDADE, Comissão Nacional da, 
2014a, p. 963. 
282 BRASIL; VERDADE, Comissão Nacional da, 2014a, p. 963. 




that justified the human rights violations as being just a few isolated 
cases.283 
 It also asserted that in the face of the magnitude of the repression, 
that affected all the different levels of the society284 these practices were 
characterised as crimes against humanity; and though the conclusions of 
the CNV did not have enforceability to the Judiciary Branch, the juridical 
value of this document should not be seen as a mere collection of opinions. 
Therefore, the final report has the quality of an official document, so any 
decisions that goes against its precepts has to be reasonable and 
justifiable.285  
 The last conclusion of the report was that the Brazilian State 
continues to perpetrate serious human rights violations, following patterns 
established in the dictatorship. Although there are no political persecutions 
anymore, the security forces persist on adopting torture, summary 
executions and enforced disappearances as means to conduct 
investigations, and as a way of repression to common crimes.286 According 
to the CNV, this situation is a result of the fact that the serious human rights 
violations that happened in the past were not properly denounced, and its 
perpetrators were never held accountable for their actions, creating 
conditions for the perpetuation of these crimes.287 
 This was the first time that the Brazilian state admitted its guilt on the 
massive human rights violations, a good step towards accountability. But 
the lack of enforceability in the final reports, and the fact that Brazil’s legal 
system does not allow the families of the victims to pursue these crimes in 
the justice system288, seem to get along with Brazil’s impunity culture. 
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 An important point that should have been addressed in the Final 
Report, but was left aside, is the acts of “terrorism” from activists and 
opposition parties. 289 The commission should have done an official 
investigation on the speculations of terrorism practices by the activists, 
which would end with the myth  that still perpetuates as a common 
knowledge in Brazil – that all the activists that opposed the dictatorship 
were actually practicing terrorist attacks against the civil order, and 
therefore “got what they deserved”.290  
 An official investigation on those acts would have been essential, 
since the victims and their families still have to deal with the stigma of being 
associated with terrorism practices.  The CNV missed the opportunity to 
officially address this problem, probably due to the fact that they decided 
to only investigate the crimes that were committed by public agents, and 
the persons at their disposal, that were supported by or acted with the 
State’s own interest.291 This is a matter that will be further discussed in this 
research.  
Based on these conclusions, the commission traced 29 
recommendations. That extensive list of measures raised questions on its 
effectiveness and applicability. To what point are they positive or negative? 
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 In the CNV’s final report, 29 recommendations were formulated and 
officially arranged in 3 different groups: institutional reforms, normative 
reformulations and follow-up measures. 292 To analyse these 
recommendations, it’s possible to separate them into five distinct groups, 
based on measures that form the core of transitional justice293. They are: 
Justice promotion to prosecute those responsible; institutional reforms to 
guard against recurrence of abuses; truth-telling; reparations to victims; 
and preservation and promotion of memory.   
However, before studying them, it is important to know that these 
recommendations are interconnected, so most of them can be classified 
into one or more of these groups. An example is criminal accountability, 
that can be qualified mainly as a Justice promotion, but has an important 
role to preservation and promotion of memory and is also important for 
institutional reforms, as the decisions can be used as a basis for tools such 
as vetting and lustration. These recommendations can contribute to one or 
more of these transitional justice measures, especially because, in the end, 
they all act together to achieve the final objectives traced by the CNV. 
 
5.1.7.1 - Promotion of Justice. 
 
 The report has two recommendations directly linked to the promotion 
of justice. The first states that, due to the recognised occurrence of massive 
human rights abuses inflicted by the Brazilian State during the dictatorship, 
characterised as crimes against humanity, there is an obligation to promote 
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criminal responsibility of the guilty.294 But the recommendation also 
acknowledges that the precepts of jus cogens (imperative international 
norms) do not recognise any internal juridical norms that promote impunity 
over crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes, even by the ones 
who were covered buy an amnesty law.295 As so, there was a serious 
pressure on the commission to not argue about this topic, since it  deals 
directly with the amnesty law and its  normative force. At the time, Brazil’s 
Supreme Court hadn’t ruled over the matter (which had a negative 
response a few years later296), so there was an immense pressure of 
politics and judges onto the CNV to wait for this decision before taking any 
position. However, the CNV assumed a position in this divergence, 
enforcing the value of the international humanitarian laws and endorsing 
the need to hold the ones responsible for human rights abuses criminally 
accountable.297 
 The mere acknowledgement of the crimes (officially done by the 
Brazilian state through the process of the CNV and the publication of its 
final report)298 was a positive step to deal with the past However, the facts 
that the commission still battled through this decision, and the Brazilian 
government hasn’t taken any steps towards the accountability of these 
crimes, make this recommendation another piece of the culture of impunity. 
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 The second recommendation was a direct proposition for the public 
administration, to redress the expenses spent in reparations to the victims 
of human rights abuses, to the public agents who were responsible for 
them.299 That means that the authors of the violations should replace the 
National Treasure for the expenses of reparations,300 since the Brazilian 
State had promoted an extensive program of reparations to the victims, on 
the terms of Law nº 9.140/95 and 10.559/02301. The CNV enforced the need 
to establish these actions of redress, but so far none of these actions were 
brought to justice. 
 This recommendation shows a cosmetic approach to the problem of 
accountability of these past human rights abuses, especially due to the fact 
that these regressive actions would overload the public prosecution office. 
Furthermore, so far (2018) there were no redress actions filled in Brazil’s 
legal system.302 
 
5.1.7.2 - Institutional Reforms; 
 
 Most of the CNV’s recommendations are related to Institutional 
reforms, proving its compromise with the guarantees of non-repetition. 
These recommendations are aimed to different public bodies and 
government branches, showing the need to reform Brazil’s public 
administration. And though most of these recommendations were not yet 
implemented (2018), they are positive initiatives to holistically improve 
Brazil’s administration- along with its positioning on human rights politics 
and the guarantees of non-repetition -, especially concerning the military 
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branches of the government, that still perpetuate a legacy from the 
dictatorship.303 
Below, some of the recommendations are separated according to the 
public bodies or government branches that they are aimed to reform: 
a) Armed Forces: there is a need to restructure the public procurements, 
as well as the continuous evaluation of its members304 and the 
curriculum of the military academies305, in order to promote and value 
the protection of democracy and human rights. 
b) Police Forces: the demilitarisation of the police, culminating in the 
extinction of the military police306, that still perpetuates a series of 
human rights abuses as they apply the military culture while handling 
the civilians.307 The CNV also recommended changes in the public 
procurements of the police forces, as well as the continuous evaluation 
programs and the curriculum of the military academies.  
c) Public bodies of forensic expertise: the untying from the legal medical 
institutes, and from the forensic bodies of the public security offices and 
the police.308 The public bodies of forensic expertise in Brazil are 
directly influenced by the police forces and the bodies of public security. 
Therefore, they maintain a strong influence on the production of 
evidences. This measure is an important step towards achieving an 
unbiased and independent work of forensic expertise.309 
d) Prison system: the creation of an ombudsman agency to manage the 
public relations310,,as well as the creation of community councils around 
the country to do a follow-up of these establishments311, the abolition of 
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vexatious searches of visitors, and the prohibition of privatisation of 
these services.312 
e) Public bodies of promotion and protection of human rights, and 
prevention of torture: the  creation of mechanisms and committees to 
prevent and fight against torture in all federal states.313 Furthermore, 
the strengthening of the Public Defender’s office, giving more 
assistance to prisoners in jails, and inside the prison system, in order to 
guarantee the protection and promotion of human rights, while also 
developing the ones that already exists, such as the CEMDP, and the 
Conselho Nacional de Direitos Humanos (CNDH) [National Council of 
Human Rights].314 
f) Judiciary Branch: the extinction of the military justice in the federal 
states, as a result of the demilitarisation,315 and the removal of civilians 
from the federal military jurisdiction. 
g) Legislative Branch: the revocation of the law of national security, 
substituting it for a legislation to defend the democratic state.316 The 
typification of the crimes against humanity and the crime of enforced 
disappearances.317 To change the laws that evoke prejudice against 
homosexuals in the military penal code, such as art. 235318, that 
criminalises libidinous acts of homosexuality in military facilities.319 
Vetting the justification of deaths in the police operations as “acts of 
prison resistance”, or “resistance followed by death”, which are 
common justifications used in police reports.320 To include a custody 
audience to guarantee the presentation of the prisoner before a judge 
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in twenty-four hours, as states the article 7321, of the inter-american 
human rights convention.322 
h) Education services: the promotion of human rights and democratic 
values in all levels of education, in public and private educational 
establishments.323 
 
5.1.7.3 - Truth-telling; 
  
 To achieve the truth-telling objective, the CNV made two different 
recommendations. The first one was to establish a permanent body to 
continue the works started by the commission by monitoring and 
implementing the recommendations, and supporting the actions to apply 
the reparations, preserve the memory of the victims, sensitise and educate 
about the massive human rights violations.324 The second aimed to 
strengthen the politics of transparency and access to information about the 
human rights violations, and to facilitate the access to the military and 
civilian archives.325 
 Starting a public body to carry out the works of the CNV shows a 
concern on establishing a legacy, as this can be a way to enforce the 
findings and the recommendations that resulted from the commissions 
works. 
 
5.1.7.4 - Reparations to victims; 
 
 Five recommendations were traced to achieve new scales of 
reparations to the victims, and they all correlate with the initial process of 
reparation that was put in action before the works of the CNV. The first was 
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the necessity of a public recognition, by the armed forces, of their 
responsibility towards victims and families.326The second was the 
ratification of the death certificates that were forged as a way of disguising 
the human rights abuses. 327The third came as a way to rectify the 
information on the public security’s database where the victims are still 
targeted as “wanted” or condemned as terrorists based on the legislation 
of the dictatorship.328 The fourth is the rehabilitation of the victims, 
guaranteeing permanent medical and psychological treatment.329 The last 
recommendation is to continue the activities that started to locate, identify, 
and deliver the mortal remains to the families, as some are still missing.330 
 These forms of reparations, that were successfully achieved by the 
CNV, showed that its commitment with dealing with the victims wasn’t just 
a pecuniary compensation. It takes into account the severity of harm that 
was inflicted, in order to achieve both symbolic and material reparations.331 
 
5.1.7.5 - Preservation and promotion of memory; 
  
 Regarding the preservation and promotion of memory, two 
recommendations are correlate with symbolic reparations332. The first is a 
series of actions, like the prohibition of any official events that celebrates 
the military coup of 1964, the creation of memory marks in buildings where 
human rights abuses occurred, the creation of an institution and museum 
in Brasília, called Museu da Memória [Musuem of Memory], and the 
nullification of any honours given to public agents, militaries or civilians 
associated with the massive human rights violations – like the Medalha do 
                                               
326 Recommendation Number 1, BRASIL; VERDADE, Comissão Nacional da, 2014a, p. 964. 
327 Recommendation Number 7, BRASIL; VERDADE, Comissão Nacional da, 2014a, p. 968. 
328 Recommendation Number 8, BRASIL; VERDADE, Comissão Nacional da, 2014a, p. 968. 
329 Recommendation Number 15, BRASIL; VERDADE, Comissão Nacional da, 2014a, p. 970. 
330 Recommendation Number 27, BRASIL; VERDADE, Comissão Nacional da, 2014a, p. 974. 
331 See more about symbolic and material reparations in: BLOOMFIELD, D.; BARNES, T.; 
HUYSE, L, 2003, p.145-161. 
332 Recommendations Number 4 and 28, BRASIL; VERDADE, Comissão Nacional da, 2014a, p. 
967 and 974. 






Pacificador [Peacemaker’s Medal]. The second recommendation is the 
alteration of all the names of schools, streets, buildings and institutions of 
any nature, public or private, that notoriously have any clear allusion to the 
human rights abuses, the dictatorship or its perpetrators.333 
 These were important recommendations, especially due to the fact 
that the militaries still “celebrated” a series of events to ensure their positive 
positioning towards the memory of the dictatorship. Therefore, the 
recommendations above stated are very effective to put an end to the 
legacy of the militaries that still haunted Brazil’s cities, as there were lots of 
schools, avenues, and monuments created in the dictatorship and named 
after the military presidents, which gave the idea that they brought progress 
to the society. 
 
5.2- The process of investigation. 
 
 Although most of the armed forces’ files from the dictatorship era 
were destroyed, the CNV did not have to gather information from scratch. 
Because some significant official archives have been located since 1989, 
the CNV had access to millions of documents from the Serviço Nacional 
de Informações [National Information Service] after they were sent to the 
National Archives.334 However, the commission did not have any powers 
to request private archives, which that was a failure of the law that 
established the CNV, difficulting the access to a series of files that could 
have helped the process of investigation.335 
 The CNV principally examined existing accounts and documents, 
instead of creating public hearings or collecting testimonials and narrations 
to gather new evidence. Only 1,116 new testimonies were collected,336 
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which was a controversial decision among the survivors and the families of 
the victims, who hoped for a more accessible public forum to share their 
narratives, and to be recognised as victims. 
 Acting independently from the government, the CNV was 
empowered to compel testimony, to name perpetrators, to subpoena 
officials (including the militaries), and to recommend public policy reforms. 
It also had a wide range of competence to investigate crimes from a 
significant time-frame, as the law covered crimes that happened between 
1946 and 1988, although the CNV’s members focused their work on the 
dictatorship, because they decided to only investigate the crimes 
committed by public agents, and the persons at their disposal, that were 
supported by or acted with the States own interest.337 This decision 
discarded the “two demons theory” – where the crimes committed by the 
dictatorship dissidents against the state, its agents and other civilians 
should be investigated – since these armed resistance acts against the 
military regime were denominated) as terrorist acts and used as a 
justification to the severe repression of the State.338 
 The decision to only investigate the crimes committed by the ones 
linked to the State is based on the idea that the State is responsible for 
every human rights violations that happened within its territory (even if 
committed by non-state actors). This derives from the idea that States are 
subjects of the international law with direct rights and responsibilities339. 
Also, there are two commonly sustained theories about the responsibility 
on human rights violations. The first assumes that the state is the only one 
responsible for the protection of human rights, and so, it’s the only one who 
can violate them (classical theory). The second says that non-State actors 
can be held accountable for human rights violations, as long as they have 
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government-like functions, or if they have a significant relation of power or 
social superiority.340 This is possible due to the global changes that have 
facilitated the growth of powers on the part of non-State actors. 
 What these two theories have in common is the reasoning that the 
human rights violations presuppose the unevenness of power between the 
perpetrator and the victims, situation, which is commonly present in 
relations with the state, and eventually, between civilians. Therefore, the 
human rights violations could only be perpetrated by the State, or non-State 
actors that are in a clear position of superiority341 which means that the 
civilians cannot be classified as perpetrators of serious human rights 
violations in acts of resistance against the State, even with the use of 
violence. But that does not mean that rebels and intern insurgents cannot 
commit serious human rights violations, because when these groups 
dominate a territory or are transformed into structured organisations, they 
achieve the role of perpetrators, as belligerent forces.342 
 In Brazil’s military regime, the armed organisations that fought 
against the dictatorship were rather weak and were not able to organise 
themselves in order to achieve a territorial control or domain over the will 
of others. Therefore, they could not be characterised as a non-State actor 
with belligerent force, and so their acts of violence, (even when against 
civilians), could not characterised as human rights violations, although they 
could be classified as political or common crimes. 343 This not only justifies 
the aim of the CNV to investigate human rights violations committed only 
by the State, its agents, and the ones linked to its will, but also explains 
why they did not focus their efforts on investigating and demystifying the 
official statement of a “war against terrorism” from the militaries. 
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Even though this absence of a characterised war was mentioned in 
the reports of the commission, the lack of an official statement that could 
end this “myth of terrorism” felt like a neglection from the CNV on the 
collective memory of victims, and their families, that still carry this terrorist 
stigma. 
 
5.2.1- The role of victims and perpetrators on the process of investigation 
 
 On the road to prevent recurrences of past atrocities, as well as to 
cleanse the corrosive effects of injuries left by the massive human rights 
abuses of the past, societies must understand the facts that led to these 
events. But in order to come fully to terms with its brutal past, they must 
uncover, precisely, who did what to whom, under whose orders and why.344 
Achieving these answers is only possible with the collaboration of both 
sides, to trace memories and handle these past events. Since the truth 
commission’s reports are addressed to the general public, their 
participation in its creation is crucial as a form to unveil the truth, and give 
voice to those who have something to contribute.345 
 The analysis on how the CNV handled victims and perpetrators of 
the military regime to produce its report is essential to criticise and study 
its impact, since the aim of a truth commission is to establish an impartial 
and honest account of past events, as a way to reconstruct historical 
memory where the conventional state institutions have failed to do 
so.346Truth commission’s members have to insert themselves as mediators 
between the victims and perpetrators, the society and the state, as a way 
to re-write such a historical backdrop.347 Because of that the CNV 
commissioners had to bridge the emotional and informational gap in order 
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to trace this historical memory. But were their efforts good enough to 
achieve this need?  
 
 
5.2.1.1- Society and victims participation. 
 
 The law 12.528 created the CNV and established that the 
commission could promote public hearings aimed to collect the narratives 
of victims and witnesses, as well as the testimonials of agents of the 
repression.348 During its mandate, the CNV organised 80 public hearings, 
collecting 565 testimonies from 14 states. As of February 2014, the public 
hearings started to present partial reports of the commission, that were 
broadcasted live and happened periodically.349 
 The CNV was formed by six members who were nominated by 
President Dilma Rousseff. This arbitrary nomination excluded society’s 
participation in the process and delegitimised people that represented the 
victims and wanted to participate actively in the process of investigation.350 
This situation encouraged the creation of non-official truth commissions 
around the country, as most victims still wanted to actively contribute with 
the CNV’s work. This was not possible, since their only channel was 
through an ombudsman agency, which raised criticism about the lack of 
participatory mechanisms in the operations.351 
 The commission decided to prioritise its efforts on the elaboration of 
a substantial report, mainly based on the analysis of documents. This 
approach was adopted in detriment of the possibility of having a wide 
political debate in society, discussing human rights violations and 
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authoritarianism, as well as the roots of Brazil’s democracy and what 
needed to change in order to proceed towards a brighter future. 
 Even so, the contribution of the general public was quite significant, 
as, according to the statistic report, the ombudsman agency received 1.984 
communications, divided into requests of information, complaints, 
suggestions, compliments, information inputs and denounces. It also 
received 399 suggestions and recommendations, in which 307 were 
pertinent to the commission’s institutional mission.352 
 The CNV also worked together with the Amnesty Commission to use 
its caravans, reaching different parts of the country with cultural seminars, 
public hearings, and the adjudication of applications for amnesty. This 
project had been implemented by the Amnesty commission since 2008, 
and as of June 2014, 86 caravans had been organised.353 
 
5.2.1.2- The perpetrators and their role on the investigatory process. 
 
 The law gave the CNV powers to subpoena those who may have 
relevant information to clarify facts and circumstances of the investigation 
process.354 This provision could have served as an important tool to collect 
information from agents of the repression, as they did not voluntarily 
contribute with their testimonials. But the CNV emphasises the lack of 
collaboration from the military forces, as there was clear attrition between 
the militaries and the works of the commission. 355  
 Despite the legal provisions, the Armed forces refused to comply with 
the law and provide evidence on the location of the bodies of the 
disappeared, refusing to cooperate with the process of investigation and 
consistently failing to provide the missing pieces of information that were 
needed to locate and clarifying the circumstances of death of many 
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victims.356 As the CNV commissioner Pedro Dallari repeatedly stated, the 
armed forces constantly responded to the CNV’s requests, but they always 
provided superficial and sometimes contradictory or false information357 
This lack of collaboration, along with the failure to delivery 
documents (according to the report only a quarter of the eighty-four official 
letters that were sent had a response, though only a minimum part of these 
responses really contributed to the investigations)358, prove the 
discontentment of the Armed forces towards the investigation process. 
Therefore, the CNV stated on its report that if the Armed Forces 
collaborated with the investigation, handling the documents produced 
during the dictatorship, the historical truth about the executions, torture and 
concealment of bodies from the political oppositions could have been better 
elucidated. That means that the work would be more fruitful.359 
 The biggest problem caused by the lack of collaboration from the 
Armed Forces came as the CNV solicited the military commands to 
establish investigations in order to clarify the misuse of different military 
facilities to practice torture and other serious human rights violations. One 
of them was the DOI-CODI (OBAN) from São Paulo, where the President 
Dilma Rousseff was detained and tortured.360 But the military commanders 
of the navy, the army and the air force stated that the investigations were 
concluded as there were not any misuses of the military facilities.361 
 This was a surprisingly outrageous response, because it stated that 
the militaries either considered that torture and other human rights 
violations were legal and compatible with the purpose of the military 
installations, or that all the denounces were unfounded, even the ones 
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specifically aimed at the DOI-CODI/OBAN in São Paulo (which the 
President Dilma Rousseff admitted in her testimony). In the first case, they 
could be assuming that the facilities had these practices of human rights 
abuses as a coherent routine of the activities in the military facilities. As of 
the second situation, they would be actually declaring that the President 
Dilma Rousseff, and many other victims, were lacking with the truth in their 
depositions and narratives.  
  It’s clear that there was not a good relation between the works of the 
CNV and the militaries, and that generated a lack of contribution from the 
“other side” in the factual and historical truth of the report. Even so, the 
CNV created a list naming the (allegedly) authors of the human rights 
violations.362 Evidently, due to the absence of persecutory capacity, caused 
by the effects of the amnesty law, the commission was not able to hold 
them accountable for their crimes against humanity.  
 According to the report, the CNV was extremely cautious while 
creating this list, always looking towards substantial proof, depositions and 
testimonies of victims, and even other agents of the repression.363 The 
CNV also stated that they tried to collect the testimony of those accused of 
being the perpetrators of the abuses, but they did not achieve success, as 
most of them decided not to attend the hearings or chose to remain silent 
in their depositions.364 
 The CNV named only 377 perpetrators. This happened as a result of 
the commission’s decision to name only the ones with irrefutable evidences 
of their crimes and the ones whose crimes were related to cases of death 
(most of them as a result of torture), disappearances or “emblematic cases” 
of torture and other violences that are mentioned in the report. Therefore, 
the Commission did not enlist the ones responsible for unlawful arrests and 
cases of torture that did not result in death.365 A Brazilian historian called 
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Carlos Fico repeatedly criticised the position of the CNV on focusing most 
on high-profile cases, as they lost an opportunity to wider the impact of the 
dictatorship on the lives of ordinary citizens.366 The number of citizens who 
were tortured, illegally imprisoned or raped is not estimated in this report,367 
and, according to Carlos Fico, this information could have served to 
demystify the idea that the repression only affected those who were against 
the system and a part of the so called “terrorist groups”. 
 Most surviving victims welcomed this list of names, especially 
because it included the chain of command and was the first official 
acknowledgement of systematic state violence. However, many local truth 
commissions and victims’ organizations such as the Tortura Nunca Mais 
called this estimative too conservative and complained about the names of 
proven torturers that had been omitted from the final report. 368 
Even though the list had mixed opinions, it was a fundamental step 
to reach the truth about the human rights violations of the past, as it was 
hailed by José Henríquez, a member of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (IACHR), who praised the work of the commission.369  
The commission enlisted the perpetrators into three different 
categories. The first is the political-institutional, that includes the ones who 
permitted the serious human rights violations, and contributed to the 
establishment of strategies that permitted them to be institutionalised.370 
This list is composed by the five presidents of the Republic during the 
military rule, and the three members of the military junta, as well as forty 
five members of the military high court of command.371 They were classified 
in this category, using a criteria of objective responsibility, because they 
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held  positions of power, and were key decision makers during the military 
dictatorship. 
 The second group presents the names of those responsible for the 
control and administration of structures and proceedings linked to the 
massive human rights abuses.372 They were also classified using objective 
responsibility criteria, where the CNV identified eighty-three agents, and in 
most cases, the facts that occurred in the unities that were under their 
command.373 
 The third category has the direct perpetrators of acts of violence and 
crimes against humanity. It is a list of two hundred and thirty-nine names, 
whose actions the CNV had concrete evidences.374  
This limited number of perpetrators is also a result of the lack of 
collaboration from the armed forces, who, as previously mentioned in this 
chapter, insisted on being apart from the investigation process. Even 
though legal provisions could have enforced the powers of the commission, 
the tension between the branches of the government and the work of the 
commission made the commissioners set the militaries aside. 
 
5.3- The CNV’s proceedings and their importance in tracing its 
effectiveness to deal with the past. 
 
 To achieve a good positioning about the effectiveness of the CNV’s 
work, it is important to know the steps that led to the creation of the final 
report. Being aware of the objectives traced in its creation, as well as the 
powers and the mandate that were set to achieve them, it’s possible to see 
that, even though the truth commission had an ambitious project to pursue, 
they were unable to achieve it completely due to a series of facts that were 
discussed. The limited amount of time to work (only two years), the wide 
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time scope (even though it was narrowed soon after its creation),375 the 
limited human resources, and the lack of a time period to structure and 
define its modus operandi were just the beginning of a series of facts that 
got in the way of the commission’s work. 
 As for the investigation process, the lack of collaboration from the 
Armed Forces just proved the discontentment of the militaries, as well as a 
tension between the branches of the government.  
Knowing that commissions serve as mediators between political 
decision makers and vulnerable sectors of the population (victims in 
particular), regulating disagreements over the violent past, it’s possible to 
identify that the objectives of the CNV were rested on the actual capabilities 
of mediation on these relations of power. But was Brazil’s CNV able to do 
so? 
To mobilise both society and state actors in order to achieve a 
common truth, the CNV implemented a series of participation mechanisms, 
through social media, their official website, live broadcastings, an 
ombudsman agency and, mostly, the creation of local commissions. These 
measures were important to get close to the public in a continental country 
like Brazil. But were they really successful? 
Sectors of the society still criticised the lack of participation and 
transparency on the CNV’s proceedings,376 more so as some of the local 
commissions were not even acknowledge by the CNV.377 It seems that the 
limited amount of time was a big problem to handle both the public and the 
creation of local commissions, especially when some of these initiatives 
kept working even after the end of the CNV.378 
Going through its final report, it is possible to identify a few problems 
on achieving the public awareness on its findings. Since it consisted on a 
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3.383 pages report divided into three volumes, with no index support, and 
written with several legal jargons and technicalities, it’s clear that it was not 
written with a mass audience in mind. Furthermore, the lack of references 
to academic historiography in the Final Report suggests that the CNV did 
not research deeply into the subject matter, a fact that can be justified due 
to the lack of human resources and the limited amount of time to do the 
investigation.379  
When we get a closer look to other commissions in Latin America, 
seeing how they approached the publication of its final reports, it is obvious 
that the CNV fell short on achieving public awareness of its findings. The 
Argentine Comisión Nacional sobre Desaparición de Personas 
(CONADEP), for example, produced a final report published in book format 
that became a bestseller.380 Another example is the Sierra Leonean 
Commission (2004), that developed a version of its final report for schools, 
and the Canadian truth and Reconciliation Commission, that offered a 
reader-friendly Executive Summary.381 
Truth Commissions are a result of society’s need to deal with its 
darkest past, making this lack of commitment to adapt the findings to a 
wider audience a crucial failure. The situation deepens since there is a 
clear audience for information on the dictatorship, which is proved with the 
best-selling numbers of Brasil: Nunca Mais, as well as the extensive 
coverage of the media on the commission’s key findings, as some of them 
even got headline news on the most important daily newspapers.382 
The importance of the public awareness is evident when one of the 
most significant indicators of a commission’s impact is its ability to generate 
                                               
379 SCHNEIDER, N. DE ALMEIDA, G. I., 2018. p.  645. 
380 For more information on the publication see: CONADEP – Nunca Más: Informe de la 
Comisión Nacional sobre la desaparición de personas, 1984. 
381 SCHNEIDER, N. DE ALMEIDA, G. I., 2018. p.  646. 
382 To find more information on the media coverage of the CNV, most specifically by the biggest 
journals in Brazil, the  “Folha de São Paulo” and “O Estado e São Paulo”. There is an article 
that makes some notes about the press covering of the final report in DE MELLO, Felipe 
Corrêa; BACCEGA, Maria Aparecida – Imprensa e discurso histórico: a Comissão Nacional da 
Verdade na Folha de São Paulo e no Estado de São Paulo, 2015. 






public debate. Therefore, the limited circulation of the final report and the 
lack of accessibility to the general public383   are two key factors on the 
CNV’s failure. However, the actual impact of a truth commission and its 
effectiveness on dealing with the past rest on an array of causal effects. 
And so, what are the actual parameters used to identify a truth 
commission’s impact? Were they successfully achieved by the CNV?  
The analysis of the proceedings contemplated in this chapter created 
the basis to answer these questions and to identify the actual effects of the 
CNV, after the publication of its final report. Keeping in mind that the 29 
recommendations can only exert some difference if they are actually 
implemented and incorporated into policy384, are there other factors that 
can define a truth commissions’ effectiveness on dealing with the past? 
It is clear that the extensive work of the CNV resulted on great 
repercussion that moved society, the public administration and the armed 
forces. The commission’s work created tension between these sectors of 
the state and generated public debate, as the controversies and conflicts 
started even before the announcement of its activities, followed its 
proceedings and arose after the publication of its report.  
Taking into account all the factors exposed in this chapter, it is 
possible to move towards an evaluation of the actual effectiveness of the 
CNV on dealing with the past?
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6 – The CNV’s Impact.  
 
 In previous chapters, we went through the evolution of transitional 
justice, explaining its phases and how it changed from a response to 
conflict – where the international community seeked justification for 
intervention and criminal sanctions on a National level385 – to an integrated 
part of good governance, human rights and peace building programmes386, 
setting a diverse array of tools to be used as a political response to human 
rights violations. 
 The importance of studying the evolution of transitional justice was 
to set the basis for narrowing this research to focus on the historical 
development of truth commissions. These commissions are one of the 
most important tools in dealing with past human rights abuses, since they 
are independent and temporary bodies, established with an official 
mandate in order to investigate and identify patterns and causes of 
violence, aiming to publish a final report with recommendations to push 
society to achieve the healing process and the guarantees of non-
repetition.387  
With this solid theoretical basis of transitional justice and truth 
commissions, another step towards answering the question on the 
effectiveness of Brazil’s CNV was to trace the historical, political and socio-
economic situation that led to the need of applying this transitional justice 
tool. In chapter 3, we answered why the CNV was needed, and studied the 
motives that led to the 32 years of silence that led into the establishment of 
it as a non-transitional commission. 
Next, we went through an analysis of the CNV’s proceedings, with 
its positive and negative aspects, as a way to finally achieve a deep 
understanding on the facts that can set its impact. This led towards 
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answering the main question of this research: was Brazilian truth and 
reconciliation commission an effective tool in dealing with the past? To 
answer it, we now need to trace the impact of the commission, setting its 
causal references and the positive and negative aspects to underlies the 
CNV’s effectiveness. 
 The truth commission’s impacts are a causal reference to the effects 
of its process on society, the state and its representatives.  To trace this 
impact, it is necessary to collect evidence of changes in policies and judicial 
procedures after the works of a truth commission, as a way to detect its 
influence on institutions’ and individuals’ interests, decisions, values, and 
beliefs.388 
 This chapter starts with the parameters used in order to evaluate the 
impact of the CNV, with direct references to mechanisms brought after the 
works of the commission and directly influenced by it. This is followed by a 
critical analysis of these mechanisms and their impact, as a way to finally 
answer the main question of this research: was Brazil’s truth commission 
an effective tool on dealing with the past? 
 A truth commission’s impact rests on its effect on government judicial 
procedures; politics; social norms; process of investigation; and other 
causal effects. However, studying its works is not an exact science –
specially as qualitative and quantitative research strategies produce 
different results in human rights research389 –, showing the need to outline 
the basis of this analysis as a way to answer the question on the 
effectiveness of the CNV. 
 
6.1- The Parameters to establish the analysis; 
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 To evaluate the works of the CNV, it is important to establish a set of 
parameters to follow. These parameters were created based on the works 
of Onur Bakiner390, Priscilla B. Hayner391, Margaret Popkin and Naomi 
Roht-Arriaza392, who produced a list of several causal mechanisms to 
evaluate the commissions’ capacity to create changes in judicial practices, 
social norms and policy. Their concrete definition, as well as the importance 
of the evaluation of the CNV’s work, will be outlined in this chapter. After 
that, the work of the CNV itself will be approached, along with the impacts 
that it produced through these mechanisms. Examples highlighted in 
previous chapters, added to a critical approach on their positive and 
negative aspects, will also be brought back in this chapter, in order to build 
new aspects that will set the conclusion of this research. 
 
6.2- Direct Political impact. 
 
 The direct political impact of a truth commission is shown through the 
incorporation of its recommendations and findings into politics.393 It 
depends crucially on the willingness of political decision makers to 
implement those suggestions, as well as publicly acknowledge the 
existence of human rights violations in order to promote the institutional 
reform394 that would lead to progress in human rights conduct and 
democratic governance. 
 The recommendations produced by a truth commission are always 
context-based and need specific implementations according to the country 
that they are produced. But it is possible to trace some key factors that 
indicate the direct political impact of a truth commission, as there is a near-
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universal demand for certain political attitudes and changes in politics.395 
The main indicators are: (1) public recognition and acknowledgment from 
a government leader of the commission's findings ; (2) the publication of 
the commission’s final report by the government; (3) the actual 
implementation of a reparation program; (4) the establishment of 
institutions to carry out the recommendations and to monitor its progress.396 
  These indicators are used as a way to capture the changes in 
policies that are directly linked to the truth commission’s recommendations. 
Because some human rights policies can be established, but not 
necessarily abide to the truth commission’s final report, they are crucial to 
analyse its direct political impact. 
 
6.2.1 - The Direct Political impact of the CNV. 
 
 The CNV’s direct political impact has a controversial achievement. 
Even though there was public recognition of the massive human rights 
abuses,397 both by the State and Brazil’s former president398, the other 
indicators have a strong negative response in its significance. 
 For instance, the actual implementation of reparations 
programmes399 is not a direct result of the CNV’s work, but a consequence 
of the efforts of the Amnesty Commission and the CEMDP. As it was 
mentioned before, these institutions400 have been working on reparations 
for years before the CNV. Therefore, the commission’s causal effect on 
these programmes cannot be traced as a positive factuality of its 
effectiveness. It’s important to mention, however, that the public 
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acknowledgment of the CNV’s final report, along with its enforcement as 
an official document, can lead to its usage at the judiciary branch, as a 
means to enforce the rights to reparations.401 
 Another negative indicator of a direct political impact lies on the fact 
that, as of 2018, not only an institution to carry out the recommendations 
and monitor their progress has not been established yet, but the Brazilian 
State completely failed to respond to most of the recommendations or to 
comply with them.402  
 In a deep  analysis of the publication of the final report, it is noticeable 
that its impacts rest on the accessibility to its content, along with its 
circulation in different sectors of society.403 Therefore, even though the final 
report of the CNV was officially recognised, published, and is currently 
available online, it lacks accessibility, which is caused by the use of legal 
jargons, the extensive form of its contents, the lack of an index guide, and 
its the limited circulation.404 That means that, although the CNV had fulfilled 
its duty in making the final report available online, its lack of promotion, 
distribution and public awareness are further negative characteristics of its 
effectiveness. This proves that the impact of a report doesn’t depend on its 
content, but on the results of its publication. 
 Due to the fact that there were no tangible changes on the 
reparations programmes as a result of the CNV’s work - added to the lack 
of accessibility to the final report and the lack of establishment by the 
Brazilian government of an institution to carry its work - it’s possible to 
conclude that the CNV has a negative direct political impact, failing to 
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6.3 - Indirect Political impact through civil society mobilisation. 
  
 The main difference between Direct and indirect political impact is 
the adoption of human rights initiatives and truth commission 
recommendations as a result only of society’s mobilisation.405 The indirect 
political impact is a result of society’s mobilisation around the truth 
commission’s work, especially in its post mandate period. The main 
indicators of its impact are: (1) non-governmental publications of the final 
report (if the government fails to do so); and (2) local, national and 
international activism from NGOs and society’s groups to monitor the 
progress of the process of investigation, the applicability of its 
recommendations and the effectiveness of the reparation programs.406 
 Society’s mobilisation is a key factor for policy changes, as  they can 
use the truth commission’s recommendations in order to hold the 
government accountable and to demand institutional reforms.407 Therefore, 
the truth commissions are a mechanism for international and domestic 
human rights groups to make demands on political changes, as well as 
evaluate progress on human rights  policies.408  When society utilises of 
these mechanisms as a result of the commission’s work, it emphasises an 
indirect political impact. 
 It’s important to know, however, that society’s mobilisation to 
pressure the government into creating a truth commission409 does not 
characterise its indirect impact. This actually shows the need to create a 
truth commission, instead of its effectiveness on dealing with the past. 
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6.3.1 - Indirect political impact of the CNV. 
  
 The indirect political impact of the CNV rests on the local and 
international activism of the truth commission’s work. To trace this impact, 
we go through the CNV’s work, the creation of unofficial truth projects410, 
society’s mobilisation to organise international and national colloquiums,411 
and the existence of local commissions, as most of them came as a 
society’s initiative. It is, therefore, obvious that society attempted to 
participate in the process of investigation,412 giving a positive response to 
the CNV’s indirect political impact. 
  As previously studied, Brazil’s society suffered for years in silence, 
building up the urge to unfold this violent past. The establishment of an 
official truth commission translated, then, into an opportunity to investigate 
and get an official recognition of their pain, which made the CNV’s indirect 
political impact, positive. 
 
6.4 - Vetting. 
 
 The process of vetting (also known as “lustration”) is important to 
screen out abusive officials, serving as one of the steps needed to achieve 
the guarantees of non-repetition.413 Because of that, several UN entities, 
like the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), released public guidelines 
recommending the use of vetting on public employees and former officials 
as a preventive measure.414 
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  The importance of vetting is clear, as its existence in the truth 
commission’s final report is the first step to achieve a positive response in 
this parameter. However, the actual causal reference of its application as 
a result of truth commissions’ work is necessary, especially because, 
despite their efforts around the world, recommendations of 
vetting/lustration have not produced a significant impact in the broader 
picture.415 Since this transitional justice tool is normally used without the 
presence of a truth commission, working as an independent tool,416 its 
existence isn’t necessarily linked to the commission. Therefore, since the 
process of vetting is not a component that only emerges as a result of a 
truth commissions work, its mere existence is not a sign of the 
commission’s impact, creating the need to set a causal reference of the 
procedure417 as a way to identify the impact of the truth commission. 
 
6.4.1- The CNV and the process of Vetting. 
 
 Even though there were recommendations for institutional reforms, 
including the application of a vetting process, 418 as of 2018 many 
perpetrators of human rights abuses still have position of power in Brazil’s 
public administration, even as political representatives.419 Consequently, 
the complete failure of achieving this step is yet another negative response 
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 Naming names, exposing, shaming and delegitimizing perpetrators, 
even if there is no official plea for a vetting process, is also an effective way 
to improve human rights conduct.420 Commissions often point out the 
institutions and individuals that were responsible for human rights 
violations, but, unlike vetting, this causal mechanism depends on the media 
and society’s support to be achieved.421 
 It is difficult to put some quantitative criteria on the delegitimation 
process, as its effects depend on society’s reactions to the individuals and 
institutions that are denounced by the truth-commission.422 Furthermore, 
those actors have a tendency to engage in extra-legal activities, actively 
plotting against the works of the commission, in order to discredit it, as a 
way to defend their power and reputation, which creates a risk to 
democratic stability and the rule of law.423 
 Taking these factors into consideration, this analysis identifies the 
impact of this criteria through a causal reference towards the existence of 
truth-finding efforts. The presence of a list of names, or even a detailed 
report on the systematic and institutional nature of the human rights 
violations, as well as the efforts  to facilitate the access to these information 
to the general public, characterise the delegitimization impact in the 
commission’s work, since424 it enables society to naturally create a 
delegitimizing effect on those responsible for the human rights abuses. 
 
6.5.1- The delegitimizing effect of the CNV. 
 
 This topic shows the complete inaccessibility of the CNV, and the 
need raise public awareness on a society’s past. Years after the publishing 
of the final report, the events that led into the impeachment of Brazil’s 
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former president Dilma Rousseff425 are strongly supported by movements 
pro-dictatorship. People are claiming for the return of a military intervention 
and political figures are publicly supporting perpetrators of human rights 
abuses.426 These facts show that the CNV completely failed to achieve the 
delegitimising effect, and even though this is a process that takes time be 
achieved, its actual positive response is unlikely. 
 
6.6- Reconciliation through consensus 
 
 The participation of victims and their relatives on the process of 
investigation show a way to rewrite the official history and achieve 
reconciliation and explain why many investigatory bodies are called “truth 
and reconciliation commissions”.427 
 Handling the victims is an important part of the truth commissions 
work, as one of its main goal concerns redress and reconciliation. But, 
since forgiveness is only achieved through the knowledge of what is to be 
forgiven,428 the importance of truth-telling, as well as creating a platform for 
victims to overcome ostracism, isolation and anger, are key factors of 
defining the commissions effectiveness.429The main factors to establish the 
effective reconciliation through consensus are: (1) the accessibility and 
transparency during the process of investigation, having platforms for both 
perpetrators and victims to engage on it; (2) the provision of reparations, 
compensations, public acknowledgment and commemorative efforts to 
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victims, their families and the community; (3) the participation of civil-
society initiatives.430 
 Tracing reparations, compensations and commemorative efforts are 
a consequential causal effect, as the efficacy of these transitional justice 
tools are a consequence to the participation of the victims into the 
proceedings. Because its repercussion is another important factor to 
establish its effectiveness,431 to achieve an effective redress to the victims 
their needs, urges and expectations have to be taken into consideration, 
and the best way to implement this is through the participation of the ones 
that are directly interested in this process. 
 Providing a platform to share stories, collect data, and incorporate a 
large group of victims as an active part of the process of investigation - 
instead of just a spectator’s reaction to a finished product -432 shows the 
importance of their stories to the commission. On the other hand,  the active 
participation of civil-society initiatives during the process of investigation 
reveals the public’s commotion and acceptance of its work.433 
 However, even though the commission provides a factual bass, the 
role to build politics of forgiveness and recognition should be evaluated as 
a long-term political and normative transformation. That requires the guilty 
to acknowledge their responsibility for the past abuses and to commit 
themselves to new standards of behaviour in the future, rather than an 
immediate reconciliation effort based only on the platforms of truth-
telling.434 Therefore, this causal explanation rests on the direct impact of 
the relations of victims, their relatives and perpetrators through time, since 
reconciliation is a complex and multi-factor process that is impossible to be 
achieved through a quick closure.435Nevertheless, the existence of a 
platform to start the reconciliation process, as well as other effective 
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mechanisms to achieve it can attribute the causal factuality of reconciliation 
through consensus to the truth commission’s efforts, stating its positive 
impact. 
 
6.6.1- The CNV’s reconciliation through consensus 
 
 The platforms of interaction, established436 in order to promote 
society’s participation in the process of investigation, were modern and 
important attempts to achieve this parameter. However, reconciliation does 
not rest only on the victims participation on a commissions proceedings, 
but rather in the actual implementation of politics of forgiveness. 
 The lack of participation by the militaries - as they refused to 
contribute with the commission’s work -,437 the critics on the transparency 
and accessibility to the investigation438 and the lack of a policy that carries 
the legacy of the commission, are evidence that the CNV was not able to 
achieve a reconciliation between victims and perpetrators. Although the 
role of a commission is to be a bridge between those two groups, both of 
them lacked representability on the commission’s staff.439 Therefore, due 
to the lack of participation, or perhaps because the operations focused on 
analysing official documents and collecting data,440, the CNV was not able 
to achieve this reconciliation through consensus. 
 
6.7- Impact on Social norms 
 
 Truth commissions aim to produce long-term effects and to cultivate 
a civic culture based on nonviolence and human rights protection. To 
achieve its objectives, the transformative potential of the commissions has 
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to reach normative changes, as way to internalise nonviolence and respect 
for human rights.441 
 While evaluating a truth commission’s impact on social norms, two 
specific causal effects should be observed: (1) widespread access to the 
final report of the truth commission (as well as other similar audio-visual 
documentation), measuring governmental and nongovernmental attempts 
to popularise the commission’s work; (2) incorporation of the commission’s 
recommendations into the school curriculum.442 
 Truth commissions can foster a spirit of respect for human rights 
protection in society, as during and in the aftermath of the commission’s 
work, people tend to write memoirs, create movies, documentaries and 
theatrical productions as a form to recount the events based on the 
testimonies and facts that were uncovered in the process.443 The 
commission’s work can also stimulate discussions on radio, television, and 
the internet, increasing public awareness of the proceedings and the 
importance of human rights protection. Knowing the truth is just the first 
step, and making it accessible to the public is the real achievement to be 
reached.444Having these causal effects as a starting point, the impact of 
social norms can be found through (1) identifying attempts to increase 
public awareness of the truth commissions work, (2) society’s mobilisation 
to popularise its findings,  and (3) the incorporation of its work inside the 
national education program.. 
 
6.7.1 - The CNV’s impact on social norms 
 
  Although the commission expressed the necessity to 
implement its findings, and the promotion of human rights, in the schools’ 
curriculums and military academies, the Brazilian State not only failed to 
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apply these recommendations, but also shortened the requirement of 
human studies in the curriculum.445 
As of 2018, the discussions and promotion of the contents in the final 
report are done by civilians and organisations. They organise public 
events, invite former CNV’s staffs to talk and explain the contents of the 
final report, and develop other ways to encourage wider discussion,446 
since the CNV didn’t adapt the report to a wider audience as it was done in 
other commissions around the world.447 
 Therefore, even though society’s mobilisations to spread  
commission’s findings are a result of the CNV’s work, they cannot be a 
signal of its effectiveness, as they do not rest on the causal factuality of the 
CNV. That means that their existence is not a result of the commission’s 
efforts, revealing a negative impact of the CNV on social norms. 
6.8- Positive judicial impact 
 
 Commissions are independent investigative bodies, and though they 
have an array of powers to investigate and achieve their objectives, they 
are not allowed to deliver sentences. Their findings, however, may be used 
as evidence or contextual information in criminal proceedings, as a way to 
achieve accountability of the past human rights atrocities.448 
 The judicial impact rests on three main causal factors: (1) the judicial 
powers that are granted to the truth commission’s mandate; (2) the 
willingness of judges, prosecutors and the legal system to incorporate the 
commission’s findings in the process of accountability; (3) the existence of 
amnesty procedures, and laws operating simultaneously or as a result of 
the commission.449 The absence of these causal factors, however, is not 
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the only signal of the lack of effectiveness on the truth commission, as there 
is a duality on its judicial impact. 
 The positive judicial impact emerges when the use of search and 
subpoena powers, as well as the power to name perpetrators, are used as 
tools to achieve the reconciliation and investigatory objectives,450 and when 
the results of the truth commission are used to start the processes of 
accountability.451 
 On the other hand, the negative judicial impact comes along with the 
vision that truth commissions serve to perpetuate impunity, especially in 
cases where they have amnesty laws built into their mandates, like the 
South African truth commission. 452 There is also an idea, in places where 
truth commissions are seen as a moderate transitional justice tool, that their 
“spectacle” creates a distraction from prosecution453 The aims to achieve 
reconciliation between victims and perpetrators, using procedures of  
negotiation to achieve consensus, are viewed in those places as having to 
choose between justice and truth.454 
 Tracing the causal factuality of the judicial impact of the truth 
commission’s work is an analysis of the main indicators that results from 
its recommendations. This means that, if the work of a truth commission 
results in impunity due to amnesty procedures (created by or along with the 
commission’s work), or society’s demobilisation caused by the “distraction” 
or “spectacle” of the commissions’ work,455 there is a negative judicial 
impact. However, the existence of accountability and incorporation of the 
truth commission’s findings in court proceedings, along with the existence 
of judicial powers in the truth commission’s mandate and its effective usage 
to achieve its investigatory objectives456, show a positive judicial impact. 
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6.8.1 - The CNV’s judicial impact. 
  
 The two most expressive signs of a judicial impact of a truth 
commission are the existence of criminal accountability on human rights 
abuses457 and the existence of an amnesty process as a result (or in 
consonance) of the commission’s work, however,458 both of these causal 
factors had a negative response in Brazil’s CNV. As it was extensively 
highlighted in this study, the lack of accountability to the human rights 
abuses are a problem with no perspective of solution, due to a series of 
normative, judicial and political barriers.459 
 Brazil’s amnesty process was not due to the commission’s work, or 
even a result of its proceedings, but a tool used in the transition to 
democracy, with a conciliatory purpose460. Consequently, the existence of 
an amnesty law in Brazil is not an indication of a positive judicial impact, 
especially because this amnesty was actually an obstacle to overcome461 
in order to achieve the CNV’s objectives. 
 Concerning the judicial powers that were given to the CNV,462 a 
positive response can be identified, as the CNV had a wide range of powers 
to conquer its objectives. However, considering the perpetuation of 
impunity463 and the fact that most of the military officials simply ignored 
official letters asking them to collaborate with the investigations (negative 
causal factors),464 it is possible to affirm that the CNV’s main purposes 
weren’t achieved. 
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6.9 – The CNV’s Overall Impact. 
 
 To set the actual effectiveness of the CNV’s impact it was necessary 
to analyse a diverse array of causal factors that could transmit either a 
positive or a negative result, leading to a real answer on the commission’s 
work. First, concerning its political impact, the negative results rest on the 
lack of commitment to the commission’s recommendations, along with the 
fact that an institution to carry out the commission’s work was not created 
(even though it was one of the main recommendations set by the 
commissions).465 It is also good to remember that the unofficial truth 
projects were a reaction to the unwillingness of the Brazilian state to 
establish a truth commission,466 and that some local commissions were 
established to fill the gap left by the works of the CNV, and even challenged 
some of its findings467. With that in mind, it’s possible to realize that the 
overall political impact of the commission was not enough.468 
 Next, the unwillingness to apply any vetting tools in Brazil’s public 
administration, along with the ineffective delegitimization process, are 
another important causal factor of the CNV. The perpetrators are still in 
positions of power, people in Brazil are claiming for the return of the military 
rule, and most of Brazil’s citizens are unaware of the commission’s findings, 
due to another negative response that rests on its impact on Social Norms. 
More so, the final report is not reader friendly469, as it was not adapted to 
the general public, and its findings are unlikely to be implemented in Brazil’s 
national education program. The CNV was also unable to achieve 
reconciliation through consensus, as victims and perpetrators were not 
able to interact through the commission's proceedings, characterising 
another negative impact. 
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 The last causal factor to set the effectiveness of the CNV rests on its 
judicial impact. Because the Amnesty law - which came way before the 
works of the CNV - left big problems to the judiciary branch, it repeatedly 
failed on achieving any processes of accountability.470 Therefore, Brazil’s 
CNV was only able to highlight the need of accountability but failed to 
actually implement it, showing that its judicial impact rested on a negative 
response. 
These indicators set that the impact of the CNV was not effective on 
dealing with these past human rights abuses. Therefore, it showed that the 
commission was a way to acknowledge some of the perpetrators and to 
officially recognize the massive human rights abuses that occurred in the 
past, while emphasizing that the State’s inability to hold these crimes 
accountable will persist through time. 
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7 – Conclusion. 
 
 The objective of this research is to analyse if Brazil’s truth 
commission was an effective tool on dealing with the past. To answer this 
question, it’s necessary to look back at the main purposes of a truth 
commission, and wonder if their primary objective is to report and rewrite 
national history, in order to achieve the guarantees of non-repetition, or to 
do an official acknowledgement of previously silenced public crimes. 
 Through an analysis of the evolution of transitional justice as a field, 
we were able to identify the main purposes of these tools and the current 
role of the CNV, which is actually a way to rewrite national history, 
acknowledging violations and victims redress, and focusing on strategies 
to prevent them from ever happening again.471  In order to analyse these 
purposes, this research highlighted the truth commissions - and how they 
evolved from a process used only in a transition towards democracy, to an 
independent investigative body established to deal with the past, devoid 
any need of a political transition -, showing how they are able to achieve 
reconciliation and effectively dealing with past human rights abuses. 
 But what exactly were the events that led into the need to create a 
truth commission? This question was answered as we went through an 
analysis of the political, historical and socio-economic placement of this 
research, investigating the events that led into the creation of the CNV. This 
paper highlighted, in that matter, the political crisis, the inflation and 
economic crisis, along with an illusion of danger caused by the communist 
influence on Latin America - which was supported by the international 
community, with stronger ties to the United States, as a way to strengthen 
its bipolar influence during the cold war. This sense of danger that was 
spread through civil-society was used by the militaries to validate their cue 
back in 1964,472  and as we analysed the effects of the repression, its 
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abuses, and how Brazilian society suffered during this time, we raised a 
question about the legacy left by the dictatorship: Why was Brazil’s CNV 
formed so late?  
 To answer it, this research pointed out the unofficial truth projects, 
society’s attempts towards accountability of these massive human rights 
abuses, and how they were used as a basis for the CNV’s work, which led 
to an analysis of its proceedings on chapter 4. As a consequence of this 
analysis, it was possible to identify the negative and positive aspects of the 
CNV to come to a conclusion: overall, considering its technical aspects, 
Brazil’s truth commission was an ambitious project, established to 
investigate more than it could actually reach.473 However, its work had  
positive aspects, such as being a pioneer on establishing local 
commissions,474 creating a diverse array of initiatives on publicising and 
giving transparency to the process of investigation,475 and being the first 
official statement that publicly recognises the Brazilian State’s 
responsibility for the systematic violence and massive human rights 
abuses.476  
 Therefore, the CNV technicalities seem to establish it as a successful 
truth commission, achieving its main purpose to publish a final report477, 
work as an independent investigative body with judicial powers478 and have 
its work recognised as an official document. Although the CNV was limited 
by various mechanisms of state control, the commissioners succeeded to 
overcome the obstacles to produce a final report, as a result of a complex 
and dynamic negotiation process between state officials with divergent 
points of view and the local commissions, while also having to respond to 
society’s demands.479 
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  However, the actual effectiveness of a truth commission goes 
beyond its process of investigation, and its technical aspects. Rather, it 
refers to the causal effects of a commissions process on institutions’ and 
individuals’ interests, beliefs, values and decisions.480 With that in mind, 
noticing that the CNV’s main achievement was to acknowledge public 
crimes that were silenced for decades, and that it failed to have an actual 
effectiveness of this public recognition - since it depended on its usage as 
a basis for criminal accountability and the application of its 
recommendations -, it’s possible to see a negative aspect of its impact.481 
 Starting with the time period for investigation, the CNV had a two 
years mandate.  The mandate, however, didn’t consider the need of a 
period to prepare its proceedings, and the commission ended up spending 
one year only to establish a modus operandi and setting a support team to 
work along with the commissioners.482 This was a very limited time to 
operate towards investigating such an ambitious mandate. 
 Another problem was the fact that most of the commissioners were 
legal experts, which meant the CNV lacked a multidisciplinary approach 
that is needed in a commission. This led to another important problem on 
the results of the CNV: the final report was not a reader-friendly document, 
since it was extensive and full of legal jargons, which excluded the general 
public from accessing it. More so, the biggest negative response lays on 
the fact that, even though the CNV was able to trace a diverse array of 
recommendations, the State completely lacked commitment to implement 
them. This shows that the actual impact of the truth commission on the 
judiciary branch, social norms, Brazil’s legal system, and on reconciliation 
between victims and perpetrators is unlikely to be achieved. 
 Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the CNV was actually a 
mere cosmetic fix. Its recommendations had no enforcement by the 
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government, who completely ignored most of them.483 Some local 
commissions came into conflict with the CNV and criticised their decisions 
on the investigations.484 The commission was not able to achieve 
reconciliation between victims and perpetrators.485 The  contents of the 
final report were important, but its accessibility to the general public was 
left aside.486 All that led to the impossibility to achieve an impact on social 
norms, as well as a delegitimizing effect.487 These indicators of a 
commission’s impact, together with the absence of a vetting process, were 
some key factors that show how the CNV was not able to lead an 
institutional reform.488 The negative aspects in evaluating the CNV’s 
impact, and the negative points that were exemplified during the analysis 
of its proceedings, were intangible factors that led us towards concluding 
that the commission was not an effective tool to deal with the past. 
 It’s important to know that the final report still has time to produce a 
long-term impact on Brazil’s history, but the fact that society is still battling 
with the need to demystify the fond memory that some Brazilians have from 
the dictatorship489, added to the bad image from the guerrillas - that are 
seen as terrorists until today (2018)490 - seem to perpetuate the obstacles 
which the CNV was established to overcome.  
Therefore, whether the report will be able to produce a long-term 
impact on Brazilian society will only depend on society’s mobilisation491 to 
create social movements, artistic representations, educate future 
generations and produce accessible reports based on the commission’s 
findings. Those, along with spreading information about the past and 
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rewriting collective memory, are the steps to finally achieve the real 
objective of a truth commission, which is to deal with the past as a way to 
unveil the truth and guarantee the non-repetition of human rights abuses. 
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